# Triples Disclosure

# 1NC Northwestern Triples

## OFFs

### 1NC --- Topicality

T Subsets

#### ‘Antitrust law’ excludes subsets but includes enforcement.

Gerber ’20 [David; October; Distinguished Professor of Law at Chicago-Kent College of Law, Illinois Institute of Technology; Oxford Scholarship Online, Competition Law and Antitrust, “What is It? Competition Law’s Veiled Identity,” Ch. 1, p. 14-15]

C. A Core Definition

The Guide uses the terms “competition law” and “antitrust law” to refer to a general domain of law whose object is to deter private restraints on competitive conduct. We look more closely at the terms:

1. “General”—The laws included are those that are applicable throughout an economy and thereby provide a framework for all market operations (there are always some exempted sectors). Laws dealing only with specific markets (e.g., telecommunication) do not play that role.

2. “Domain of Law” here refers to a politically authorized set of norms and the institutional arrangements used to enforce them.

Is it law—or is it policy? The relationship between “competition law” and “competition policy” is not always clear. Often the terms are used interchangeably, but there can be important differences between them. Both can refer to norms used to combat restraints on competition, but they represent two different ways of looking at the relevant laws, and the differences can influence how norms are interpreted and applied. “Law” implies that established methods of interpretation are used to interpret and apply the norms and that established procedures are the sole or primary means of enforcing and changing the norms. In this view, the norms are a relatively stable component of a legal system. Thinking of those same norms as “policy,” on the other hand, implies that they are a tool of whatever government is in power and that it can use and modify them as it wishes.

3. “Restraint” refers to any limitation imposed by one or more private actors that reduces the intensity of competition in a market.

4. “Competition” refers to a process by which firms in a market seek to maximize their profits by exploiting market opportunities more effectively than other firms in the market.

#### Vote Neg

#### 1 --- Limits --- explodes the number of affirmatives to any possible sector.

#### 2 --- Ground --- specific sectors erase possibility of negative generics against tiny affirmatives.

### 1NC --- CP (Adv)

CP Advantage

#### The United States federal government should

#### substantially increase investment in infrastructure, human capital and the labor force in rural economies,

#### provide additional resources and reduce administrative barriers for emergency room responses to opioid addiction and overdose treatment as per our Hoban evidence,

#### announce and implement violence-targeted enforcement against major Latin American criminal organizations and mandate preventative action against the most violent organizations for destruction.

#### This is key to rural economies

O’Brien 13 [Doug O’Brien, Deputy Under Secretary for USDA Rural Development Strong Rural Communities, Stronger America, USDA (United States Department of Agriculture), 1-22-13, http://blogs.usda.gov/2013/01/22/strong-rural-communities-stronger-america/]

Strong Rural Communities, Stronger America Celebrating 80 Years of Partnership REAPing America’s Clean Energy Future Collective Solar Victory in Virginia Last week, the Department hosted several members of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) at USDA headquarters in Washington to highlight the findings of a new report, Promoting Growth in All Regions, that says investments in rural places are vital for aggregate national economic growth and in many cases, such investments have found that rural regions have, on average, enjoyed faster growth than urban regions. For an OECD policy brief that outlines the report’s findings visit this link. In this time of economic challenges, the United States and other members of OECD cannot leave significant growth opportunities in rural regions untapped. The authors of the OECD report are in Washington this month to launch the report and urge policy makers not to overlook this reality when crafting economic policy for the country. President Obama and Agriculture Secretary Vilsack have long believed that “strong rural communities are key to a stronger America.” This study provides rigorous research and explanation for why regional rural economies are so important to a nation’s overall economic health. While this report is certainly not the first study to examine the importance of strengthening rural regions, it is notable for its comprehensive, longitudinal, and cross-national analysis. The report’s authors point out that overlooking the economies of these regions may constitute a missed opportunity for significant economic growth. Missed growth opportunities are also missed revenue opportunities for governments facing budgetary shortfalls and rising deficits. Policy experts must develop comprehensive policy packages that integrate investments in infrastructure, human capital and the labor force to improve rural economies. Additionally, regions must identify their local assets and build a development plan based on those assets. Many US regions are leading the way in developing such place-based growth strategies. A second recent OECD report, called Linking Renewable Energy to Rural Development contains case studies from Iowa, Maine, Vermont, Tennessee and Oregon. In each of these states, local regions identified renewable energy generation as a local opportunity, and with the help of Rural Development, made strategic investments to develop the potential of renewable energy in the area by linking it to already existing industries, like manufacturing to wind turbine production in Iowa, and the forest products industry to woody biomass in Maine. The Promoting Growth in All Regions report concludes with a number of findings and policy recommendations that are important for rural economies. They include: Investing in less-developed regions makes good economic sense; A pro-growth strategy focused on the assets of the region is the most beneficial and sustainable approach; Policies that support education and training for low-skilled workers are critical; Infrastructure development has the greatest impact when coordinated with other development policies; Formal and informal institutions that facilitate communication and collaboration in the region are vital. To learn more, visit Rural Development’s new interactive web map featuring program funding and success stories for the past four fiscal years.

#### Emergency rooms are the front lines against the opioid epidemic – the CP solves best

Hoban 17 (Brennan, Program Assistant at the Brookings Institution. “The far-reaching effects of the US opioid crisis.” Brookings Institution. 10/25/17 https://www.brookings.edu/blog/brookings-now/2017/10/25/the-far-reaching-effects-of-the-us-opioid-crisis/)

The USC-Brookings Schaffer Initiative for Health Policy’s Jason N. Doctor and Michael Menchine also say that emergency rooms are playing a significant role in the opioid crisis. First, emergency room visits are a notable source of the over-prescription of opioids—often with deadly consequences. Narcotic overdose is the eighth leading cause of death within one week of an emergency room visit. Additionally, emergency rooms are often on the frontlines of treating those harmed by the epidemic. Currently, there are over 300,000 estimated annual emergency department visits for opioid overdose. New policies could help mitigate the crisis To address the crisis, Doctor and Menchine explain Congress and the Trump administration will have to focus on reducing population exposure to opioids, creating demand for safe and effective treatments, and the effective use of emergency departments. They recommend that the current administration and Congress fund additional resources to emergency rooms, including: The development of opioid dependence screening tools for the emergency department; Training to emergency department staff on how to address potentially opioid dependent individuals in an ethically neutral manner; The expansion of referral sources for outpatient addiction specialty clinics (particularly for uninsured patients or those with Medicaid insurance); Reduced administrative barriers to becoming a Buprenorphine prescriber; and The development of a financial reimbursement model for prescription opioid screening or treatment in emergency room settings.

#### Best way to stop violence

Kleiman, '11 [Mark, Professor of Public Policy at the Luskin School of Public Affairs at the University of California, Los Angeles. He is Editor of the Journal of Drug Policy Analysis, the author of When Brute Force Fails, and a co-author, with Jonathan Caulkins and Angela Hawken, of Drugs and Drug Policy, Foreign Affairs, Oct, http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/68131/mark-kleiman/surgical-strikes-in-the-drug-wars]

ALL ILLICIT MARKETS ARE NOT CREATED EQUAL

Although antidrug law enforcement has little capacity to shrink the volume of drugs sold, it has a great, but largely latent, capacity to reduce the damage done in the process. Assigning priority to violence reduction would reshape U.S. and Mexican enforcement efforts, albeit in different ways: the United States would have to change its approach to retail dealing, whereas Mexico would need a new strategy for handling the country's six large-scale trafficking organizations. Yet the basic goal would be the same on both sides of the border: to reduce the levels of violence caused by the trafficking and sale of illicit drugs.

### 1NC --- DA (Politics)

DA Infrastructure

#### Biden slaps backs to pass infrastructure.

López ’9-16 [Burgess Everett and Laura Barrón-López; 2021; reporters, citing Senate Majority Whip Dick Durbin, Sen. Richard Blumenthal, Andrew Bates, a spokesperson for Biden, and Celinda Lake, a pollster on Biden’s campaign; Politico, “Dems call in big gun as they face huge Hill tests,” https://www.politico.com/news/2021/09/16/biden-influence-capitol-democrats-511952]

The next few months will push President Joe Biden to wield every drop of his influence over Congress.

Democrats are plunging into messy internal debates over social programs from child care to drug pricing as they try to beat back GOP resistance on voting rights while steering the United States away from economic catastrophe. And in order to avert a government shutdown, avoid a debt default and fight ballot access restrictions passed in some GOP states, Democratic lawmakers are urging Biden to get more directly involved.

Senate Majority Whip Dick Durbin said that Biden, “more than anyone,” maintains sway over his caucus’s 50 members: “There is no comparable political force to a president, and specifically Joe Biden at this moment.”

Biden appears to be answering the call. The president is getting increasingly involved in Congress’ chaotic fall session as he battles sagging approval ratings, heightened concerns around the pandemic and some internal criticism over his withdrawal from Afghanistan. On Thursday, he'll speak to Senate Majority Leader Chuck Schumer and Speaker Nancy Pelosi ahead of a critical week for funding the government and lifting the debt ceiling.

Rebounding as the midterms draw nearer will depend on whether his big social spending ambitions are realized and if his party can dodge a government shutdown and credit default. But even if he has success on those fronts, he still needs to maintain momentum on Democrats’ elections legislation, which Republicans look certain to torpedo.

“I have full faith and confidence in Joe Biden in all of this,” said House Majority Whip Jim Clyburn, who's pressed Biden to endorse a filibuster carve out for voting rights legislation. “He is working this … and that’s how it should be.”

Biden met with two key Democratic holdouts on his domestic spending agenda on Wednesday, part of a sustained push to keep Sens. Joe Manchin (D-W.Va.) and Kyrsten Sinema (D-Ariz.) on board with his legislative program. Biden’s met with Sinema four times this year, in addition to telephone calls made between the two, and has spoken to Manchin a similar number of times.

“Now is the time” for Biden to jump full-force into the reconciliation conversation, said Sen. Tim Kaine (D-Va.). And the White House made clear that Biden is diving into the series of tricky issues.

Andrew Bates, a spokesperson for Biden, said that Biden and his administration "are in frequent touch with Congress about each key priority: protecting the sacred right to vote, ensuring our economy delivers for the middle class and not just those at the top, and preventing needless damage to the recovery from the second-worst economic downturn in American history.”

To help corral all 50 Senate Democrats for the social spending bill, the president and his party need to create an “echo chamber” around its substance, said Celinda Lake, a pollster on Biden’s campaign. But that won't be easy. Manchin has told colleagues he’s worried about whether the bill’s safety net, climate action and tax reforms will be popular in his state, according to one Senate Democrat. He's also said he won't support a measure at the current spending level: $3.5 trillion.

If Biden can hammer home the popular aspects of the spending plan, it may help assuage Manchin and improve his whip count in Congress. Underscoring the degree to which he's become the face of the multi-trillion dollar reconciliation bill, a Democratic aide said the party is increasingly seeking to frame it as Biden’s agenda, not that of Sen. Bernie Sanders (I-Vt.) or any single Democrat.

“People think they like the reconciliation package, but they really don't know what's in it,” said Lake, who added that her polling shows popularity for the measure, particularly among women and seniors.

The coming months will also challenge Biden’s relationship with Republicans, who are threatening to block a debt limit hike after many of them supported a suspension or increase three times under former President Donald Trump. Biden campaigned as a Democrat who could work with Republicans, and he succeeded this summer by rounding up 19 Senate GOP votes for a $550 billion infrastructure bill.

Yet he’s running into a brick wall in convincing Senate Minority Leader Mitch McConnell to provide at least 10 GOP votes to lift the nation's borrowing limit. Republicans say Biden’s dip in the polls isn’t driving their strategy on the debt ceiling. But it’s not helping either.

“I don’t think anything in the last month has increased the likelihood that he can now create an atmosphere of: Let’s work together,” said Sen. Roy Blunt (R-Mo.), who voted for the infrastructure bill and debt ceiling increases under Trump.

The White House is, so far, sticking by its plan to try and call McConnell’s bluff. Aides in the West Wing consider attaching a debt ceiling suspension or increase to a government funding measure the best way to pressure Republicans on the routine step required by law. Should that approach fail, they may be forced to separate the two fiscal measures to avert a shutdown.

On the debt limit, congressional Democrats are in lockstep with the administration's strategy. But they're looking for Biden to exhibit more of his arm-twisting and back-slapping skills on their social spending plan and their bid to shore up voting rights protections.

Biden “knows better than anyone the power of the United States [presidency] in persuading and sometimes cajoling the key members of Congress, when push comes to shove,” said Sen. Richard Blumenthal (D-Conn.).

#### Antitrust requires PC, knocking out competing domestic initiatives.

Carstensen ’21 [Peter; February 2021; Fred W. & Vi Miller Chair in Law Emeritus at the University of Wisconsin Law School; Concurrences, “The ‘Ought’ and ‘Is Likely’ of Biden Antitrust,” <https://www.concurrences.com/en/review/issues/no-1-2021/on-topic/the-new-us-antitrust-administration-en#carstensen>]

14. Similarly, despite bipartisan murmurs about competitive issues, the potential in a closely divided Congress that any major initiatives will survive is limited at best. In part the challenge here is how the Biden administration will rank its commitments. If it were to make reform of competition law a major and primary commitment, it would have to trade off other goals, which might include health care reform or increases in the minimum wage. It is likely in this circumstance the new administration, like the Obama administration’s abandonment of the pro-competitive rules proposed under the PSA, would elect to give up stricter competition rules in order to achieve other legislative priorities.

15. Another key to a robust commitment to workable competition is the choice of cabinet and other key administrative positions. Here as well, the early signs are not entirely encouraging. In selecting Tom Vilsack to return as secretary of agriculture, the president has embraced a friend of the large corporate interests dominating agriculture who has spent the last four years in a highly lucrative position advancing their interests. Given the desperate need for pro-competitive rules to implement the PSA and control exploitation of dairy farmers through milk-market orders, the return of Vilsack is not good news. Who will head the FTC and who will be the attorney general and assistant attorney general for antitrust is still unknown, but if those picks are also centrists with strong links to corporate America the hope for robust enforcement of competition law will further attenuate!

16. In sum, this is a pessimistic prognostication for the likely Biden antitrust enforcement agenda. There is much that ought to be done. But this requires a willingness to take major enforcement risks, to invest significant political capital in the legislative process, and to select leaders who are committed to advancing the public interest in fair, efficient and dynamically competitive markets. The early signs are that the new administration will be no more committed to robust competition policy than the Obama administration. Events may force a more vigorous policy—I will cling to that hope as the Biden administration takes shape.

#### Infrastructure passage lowers clean energy costs globally and solves existential climate change.

Bordoff ’21 [Jason; March 15; J.D. from Harvard Law School, co-founding dean of the Columbia Climate School, Professor of Professional Practice in International and Public Relations at Columbia University; Foreign Policy, “The Time for a Green Industrial Policy Is Now,” https://foreignpolicy.com/2021/03/15/biden-climate-energy-transition-green-new-deal-industrial-policy/]

Now that U.S. President Joe Biden’s $1.9 trillion plan for economic stimulus and pandemic relief has become law, his administration will turn its attention to a multitrillion-dollar plan to rebuild the United States’ ailing infrastructure. Its scope goes far beyond roads and bridges. Viewed in combination with other parts of Biden’s economic agenda, it reflects a new openness on both sides of the aisle to what has traditionally been known as industrial policy. Critics deride industrial policy as protectionist and as the government picking “winners,” but when it comes to clean energy—a top priority for Biden—a push by his administration to build new and innovative clean energy sectors using industrial policy may actually be the greatest contribution it can make to combating climate change.

Industrial policy, long anathema to mainstream economic policymakers in Washington, is back in vogue. The Biden administration’s Build Back Better economic plan includes targeted support for specific industries to make them more competitive with Asia and Europe and government procurement provisions to boost domestic manufacturing with “Buy America” requirements. As White House economist Jared Bernstein wrote in Foreign Policy, “the rationale for industrial policy is as strong as ever.” Biden’s national security advisor, Jake Sullivan, similarly wrote in Foreign Policy that “advocating industrial policy … should be considered something close to obvious.” Even Republicans, such as Sen. Marco Rubio, have been willing to deviate from the free-market’s gospel by endorsing industrial policy.

The push for industrial policy has been particularly strong for clean energy—as a way to combine battling climate change with building strategically important parts of the economy. The Green New Deal in 2019 drew the link between achieving net-zero emissions and creating millions of jobs by investing in the “industry of the United States.” Biden’s top economic advisor, Brian Deese, said, “some of the biggest opportunities” in climate policy right now are “what some people would call straight-out industrial policy.”

Industrial policy is a phrase used to mean different things. Broadly speaking, it refers to government intervention in the economy to promote and protect targeted sectors, often those considered strategically important. The term is therefore instinctively distasteful to those schooled in the laissez-faire, free-market orthodoxy of Adam Smith’s “invisible hand.” They worry about a creeping state capitalism that favors well-connected companies, stifling innovation and competition.

In reality, of course, the energy sector has never been free of government intervention. Nearly every source of energy receives some degree of favorable tax treatment. Nuclear energy receives government liability protection. Government investment and research gave rise to the shale revolution. As Robert McNally points out in his book, Crude Volatility: The History and the Future of Boom-Bust Oil Prices, the Texas Railroad Commission was the most successful oil cartel in history in setting prices, and even a Republican president like Dwight D. Eisenhower protected the domestic oil industry from the threat of imported oil.

To be fair, there are good reasons for government intervention in the energy market. Energy use and production can impose harm on others, such as through air pollution and carbon emissions. Energy innovation delivers benefits to all of us beyond the economic gains the innovator can capture. Energy infrastructure investment, such as pipelines, transmission lines, and electric vehicle chargers, may be hampered if any one firm’s investments benefit all their competitors or if it risks monopolistic market power of energy delivery mechanisms.

The argument for government’s role in the energy sector is even stronger today. First, the world faces an existential threat from climate change. With time running short to begin sharply curbing emissions, market forces will not deliver the pace of transition needed without robust government intervention. Second, the scale of that transition creates enormous economic opportunity to build new energy sectors. With the economy in a deep hole from the pandemic, leading in these new sectors can spur significant job growth. Finally, given the strategic importance of energy—critical to every citizens’ economic and physical well-being and safety, as the recent crisis in Texas reminded us—there is a strong national security rationale to develop these technologies and capabilities in the United States. As the energy system transitions to cleaner alternatives, there will be new risks associated with the critical minerals’ supply chains required for renewable energy and batteries, cybersecurity, and global trade chokepoints, which argues for reinforcing the domestic U.S. industrial base in these technologies.

To tackle the problem of climate change, Sullivan and Biden’s China advisor, Kurt Campbell, persuasively argued that the United States must pursue not only cooperation but also economic competition with China, for example. Noting that both Democrats and Republicans “are making a convincing case for a new U.S. industrial policy,” they called for more government investment in infrastructure and research in clean energy, among other areas, to confront such a “challenging economic competitor” as China.

The argument against industrial policy to combat climate change is that the government cannot anticipate which technologies will deliver the cheapest solutions. Yet, as the International Energy Agency explained, most of the key technologies the energy sector needs to reach net-zero emissions are known today. Market forces are still powerful—when properly directed by a carbon price—to give firms and consumers the right incentives to adopt and develop those technologies and to determine which ones emerge as the best solutions in different energy sectors.

Moreover, critics of industrial policy argue that if the goal is to reduce emissions as fast as possible, it should matter less whether the technology is made in the United States than whether it is as cheap as possible so more people will adopt it. Germany’s Energiewende, a comprehensive plan to shift the country to renewable energy, has been criticized for its high cost per ton of emissions avoided, which economists have estimated to be between $600 and $1500, much costlier than most other policy interventions. (To put the German numbers in context: The Obama administration estimated the total harm caused by one ton of carbon dioxide to be around $50, although there are good arguments to revise that figure higher.) Jason Furman, a Harvard professor and former Obama administration economic advisor, said “if you think climate change is the biggest challenge facing the country … you should want to make sure a lot of solar and wind energy is produced in the United States. You shouldn’t care nearly as much where panels and turbines are produced.”

Furman’s view is correct if the goal is to cut emissions in the United States as fast as possible. But what if the goal is to decarbonize the entire world’s emissions as fast as possible? What if the goal is to show climate leadership by helping all nations achieve net-zero emissions? In that case, the measure of U.S. climate policy should be less about how fast it brings down domestic emissions, only 15 percent of the world’s annual total, than about how fast it brings down the cost of clean technologies needed for the rest of the world to decarbonize.

Some clean energy technologies, such as solar and wind power or electric vehicles, are fairly cost competitive today relative to their carbon-intensive counterparts. Yet as Bill Gates explained in his new book, the cost difference between carbon-emitting and carbon-free production—what he calls the “green premium”—remains exceptionally high for many sectors and technologies, such as cement and steel, air travel and shipping, long-duration energy storage to cope with the intermittency of renewable energy, and steady sources of electricity like nuclear power or natural gas with carbon capture and storage. These technologies may not be needed to make a large dent in emissions by 2030, but they will absolutely be needed to achieve net-zero emissions by mid-21st century. Consider that the largest source of global greenhouse gas emissions comes from what Gates calls “making things,” such as the production of cement, steel, and plastics—sectors that will almost certainly need nascent technologies to decarbonize.

To promote domestic industries developing technologies for such hard-to-decarbonize sectors, policies should boost demand for such products, spur their deployment, and lower production costs. As first U.S. Treasury Secretary Alexander Hamilton famously explained: “In matters of industry, human enterprise ought, doubtless, to be left free in the main, not fettered by too much regulation; but practical politicians know that it may be beneficially stimulated by prudent aids and encouragements on the part of the Government.”

What might such a clean energy industrial policy look like? Dramatically increasing clean energy research and development funding can accelerate needed innovation. Subsidies can lower the cost of clean energy technologies, and a carbon price can increase the cost of carbon-intensive alternatives. The government can use its procurement power to create more demand or reduce risk for developers by signing long-term energy purchase agreements or guaranteeing them a certain price by paying the difference to prevailing market prices (the “contract for difference” model used in the United Kingdom). Low-cost loans and loan guarantees can support projects by lowering the cost of capital and the barriers to accessing private capital because of perceived technological risk. Infrastructure investment and streamlined permitting can boost demand and overcome chicken-and-egg problems. For example, there may be little incentive to develop zero-carbon hydrogen or install carbon-capture technology on power plants if there are no pipelines to transport fuel or carbon dioxide—but firms will not build the infrastructure until the new technology is commercialized. Trade and economic policy can align U.S. competitiveness with a global clean energy transition, such as through export finance to help clean energy companies compete with Chinese and other competitors in emerging markets. Some argue industrial policy should also protect U.S. firms through import tariffs or “Buy America” provisions, but such protectionist tools risk backfiring if retaliatory measures by other countries close export markets to these new domestic industries.

There are three reasons a U.S. clean energy industrial policy makes particular sense today. First, the technologies needed for sectors that are hard to decarbonize also offer many of the biggest economic opportunities for growth. According to the International Energy Agency, almost half of the cumulative emission reductions needed to achieve net-zero emissions by 2050 come from technologies that are not yet commercially available. China already dominates the market for solar panels and batteries, a result of government decisions taken more than a decade ago, so it would be very difficult for the United States to displace China in these technologies, which China already produces very cheaply. By contrast, the United States is well-positioned to build a strong industrial base to produce and export zero-carbon energy in the form of hydrogen and ammonia, fuel cells to produce zero-carbon electricity, or carbon-capture and removal technologies.

Second, these technologies will be needed to decarbonize globally, and by bringing the cost of these technologies down through government investments, Washington can help accelerate their deployment outside the United States as well. In this way, a U.S. industrial policy to promote clean energy can serve not as protectionism but as one of the country’s greatest contributions to global efforts to combat climate change. In the future, roughly 95 percent of all greenhouse gas emissions will come from outside the United States. Yet developing market countries, which are poorer and use much less energy per capita than developed countries do, will not adopt low-carbon solutions unless they are affordable.

Third, industrial policy that drives down the cost of clean energy “green premiums” while also putting U.S. citizens to work can be among the most effective ways to account for the United States’ historic responsibility for the climate change problem. Climate change results from the cumulative total of all carbon emissions over time, and as of 2019, the United States has contributed 25 percent. By contrast, the entire continent of Africa represents only 2 percent. One way to address this inequity is for wealthy countries to send cash to poorer countries. For example, the Biden administration has pledged that the United States will fulfill its 2014 commitment to provide climate-related assistance to poorer countries, of which $2 billion is still outstanding. But making it affordable for developing countries to grow their energy use and prosperity in climate-friendly ways can be a far greater contribution.

At present, U.S. climate policy ambition is being framed around what commitment Biden will make to reduce domestic emissions by 2030. Yet the steps the Biden administration takes to invest in nascent clean energy technologies and research can be even more important to long-term temperature stabilization goals, even if most of the dividends come after 2030 because of the time it takes for hydrogen, long-duration power storage, carbon capture, advanced nuclear power, and other emerging technologies to scale.

### 1NC --- DA (FTC)

DA FTC Tradeoff

#### The FTC will enforce ‘right to repair’ now

Minter ’21 [Adam; July 11; Columnist and author; Bloomberg, “Americans Must Reclaim Their Right to Repair,” <https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2021-07-11/americans-must-reclaim-their-right-to-repair>]

When the Apple II personal computer was shipped in 1977, it came with a [detailed manual](https://archive.org/details/Apple_II_Mini_Manual/page/n49/mode/2up) for upgrading and repairing the device. Parts were readily available from Apple Inc. (and, later, other manufacturers), and if Apple owners didn’t want to fix or upgrade at home, they could find plenty of small, competitive repair businesses to do the work for them.

That was then. These days, Apple’s products arrive sealed shut, often with [proprietary screws](https://www.ifixit.com/News/9905/bit-history-the-pentalobe). Service manuals, circuit-board schematics and repair parts are [reserved](https://www.ifixit.com/News/43179/apple-endangers-our-business-model-gets-a-repairability-point-for-it) for Apple’s technicians, shops and a handful of “authorized” partners. With no access to parts, manuals or indie repair shops, consumers pay much more to keep their devices running.

President Joe Biden’s new executive order to promote competition encourages the Federal Trade Commission to end such anti-competitive repair monopolies. It’s a contentious move. Apple and the makers of other technological products from farm tractors to [35mm cameras](https://www.ifixit.com/News/1349/how-nikon-is-killing-camera-repair) argue that their repair monopolies are good for consumers. But as these monopolies have grown, their toll on consumers, the environment and American productivity and innovation has risen. Biden’s recognition of a “right to repair” can help lower these costs and, at the same time, spur new kinds of growth across the economy.

Repair has always been a part of American life. The first prairie farmers had no option but to repair their own carts and plows. When mechanization came along, farmers became expert technicians — so skilled that companies often consulted them on tractor designs. During the past 15 years, as computers have been integrated into expensive farm equipment, that relationship has broken down. The handful of remaining implement manufacturers make sure that only dealerships, with specialized software tools, can diagnose problems. Those same tools are often also needed to install parts and authorize repairs.

The costs to farmers can be significant. Paying a Deere & Co dealership to plug in a computer to clear an error code on a tractor or combine can cost [hundreds of dollars](https://www.vice.com/en/article/xykkkd/why-american-farmers-are-hacking-their-tractors-with-ukrainian-firmware) — not including transporting the tractor to the dealership. Worse, by limiting access to crucial diagnostic and repair tools, manufacturers cause significant delays during harvest, planting and other busy periods. At certain times, a piece of equipment immobilized for even a few hours can cost a farmer thousands of dollars.

As farmers lose money, farm manufacturers with parts and service businesses [profit handsomely](https://uspirg.org/feature/usp/deere-headlights). From 2013 to 2019, Deere & Co annual sales of new equipment declined 19%, to $23.7 billion, while sales of parts increased 22%, to $6.7 billion. Harvester manufacturers aren’t the only ones who’ve spotted a growth market in restricting access to repair. In 2019, Apple’s Tim Cook [conceded](https://www.apple.com/newsroom/2019/01/letter-from-tim-cook-to-apple-investors/) that lower-cost iPhone battery replacements had negatively impacted new iPhone sales. More expensive repairs, on the other hand, lead customers to think they may as well buy a new phone.

That’s bad for the buyers of Apple’s expensive new phones and even worse for lower-income consumers who rely on secondhand devices. Lack of competition in repair markets raises the cost of owning older devices, and ultimately accelerates their untimely, wasteful disposal.

The first calls to roll back manufacturer restrictions on repair, in the early 2010s, were focused on cars. But the problem now encompasses everything from phones to farm equipment. Since 2014, [32 states](https://www.repair.org/legislation) have considered so-called Fair Repair bills. Earlier this year, the New York legislature became the [first](https://states.repair.org/states/newyork/) to pass one.

But manufacturers have pushed hard to defeat such legislation. In 2017, Apple warned Nebraska lawmakers that Fair Repair “would make it very easy for hackers to relocate to Nebraska.” [TechNet](http://technet.org/), a trade group that represents Apple, Amazon Inc. and Google, has [warned](https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2021-05-20/microsoft-and-apple-wage-war-on-gadget-right-to-repair-laws) several states that Fair Repair legislation would somehow jeopardize the safety of devices. (TechNet did not respond to requests for examples of such consumer safety threats.)

The federal government has not bought these arguments. In May, the Federal Trade Commission [reported](https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/blogs/business-blog/2021/05/nixing-fix-report-explores-consumer-repair-issues) that “many of the explanations manufacturers gave for repair restrictions aren’t well-founded.” Biden’s executive order now encourages the FTC to “limit powerful equipment manufacturers from restricting people’s ability to use independent repair shops or do DIY repairs.”

#### The plan trades off.

Nylen ’20 [Leah; December 10; Antitrust journalist; Politico, “FTC suffering a cash crunch as it prepares to battle Facebook,” <https://www.politico.com/news/2020/12/10/ftc-cash-facebook-lawsuit-444468>]

The agency that just launched a landmark antitrust suit to break up Facebook is so strapped for cash that its leaders have discussed shrinking their staff and warned against taking on more cases.

In a series of emails to all Federal Trade Commission staff, obtained by POLITICO, Executive Director David Robbins said the agency would face a period of “belt tightening” to cut costs — and that filing fewer cases and trimming litigation expenses must be on the table.

“[W]e will either need to bring fewer expert intensive cases or significantly decrease our litigation costs (e.g. experts, transcripts, litigation support contractors, etc.),” Robbins said in an Oct. 29 email.

The emails offer an increasingly dire portrait of the money woes facing the FTC, which has launched a record amount of litigation in the past year even as the pandemic has caused a sharp reduction in the corporate merger filing fees that normally supply about half its budget. The crunch also raises the possibility that the FTC may not have the cash it needs to win its case against Facebook, which is gearing up for an expensive fight, or to take on additional companies like Amazon.

#### repair restrictions undermine cybersecurity.

Koebler ’17 [Jason; March 21; Editor in Chief; Vice, “Why American Farmers Are Hacking Their Tractors with Ukrainian Firmware,” <https://www.vice.com/en/article/xykkkd/why-american-farmers-are-hacking-their-tractors-with-ukrainian-firmware>]

"If a farmer bought the tractor, he should be able to do whatever he wants with it," Kevin Kenney, a farmer and right-to-repair advocate in Nebraska, told me. "You want to replace a transmission and you take it to an independent mechanic—he can put in the new transmission but the tractor can't drive out of the shop. Deere charges $230, plus $130 an hour for a technician to drive out and plug a connector into their USB port to authorize the part."

"What you've got is technicians running around here with cracked Ukrainian John Deere software that they bought off the black market," he added.

Kenney and Kluthe have been pushing for right-to-repair legislation in Nebraska that would invalidate John Deere's license agreement (seven other states are considering similar bills). In the meantime, farmers have started hacking their machines because even simple repairs are made impossible by the embedded software within the tractor. John Deere is [one of the staunchest opponents of this legislation](https://motherboard.vice.com/en_us/article/farmers-right-to-repair).

"There's software out there a guy can get his hands on if he looks for it," one farmer and repair mechanic in Nebraska who uses cracked John Deere software told me. "I'm not a big business or anything, but let's say you've got a guy here who has a tractor and something goes wrong with it—the nearest dealership is 40 miles away, but you've got me or a diesel shop a mile away. The only way we can fix things is illegally, which is what's holding back free enterprise more than anything and hampers a farmer's ability to get stuff done, too."

I went searching for one of the forums where pirated John Deere firmware is sold. After I found it, I couldn't do much of anything without joining. I was sent an email with instructions, which required me to buy a $25 dummy diagnostic part from a third-party website. Instead of the part, I was sent a code to join the forum.

Once I was on it, I found dozens of threads from farmers desperate to fix and modify their own tractors. According to people on the forums and the farmers who use it, much of the software is cracked in Eastern European countries such as Poland and Ukraine and then sold back to farmers in the United States.

#### Grid vulnerabilities spark nuclear war.

Klare ’19 [Michael; November; Professor Emeritus of Peace and World Security Studies at Hampshire College; Arms Control Association, “Cyber Battles, Nuclear Outcomes? Dangerous New Pathways to Escalation,” https://www.armscontrol.org/act/2019-11/features/cyber-battles-nuclear-outcomes-dangerous-new-pathways-escalation]

Yet another pathway to escalation could arise from a cascading series of cyberstrikes and counterstrikes against vital national infrastructure rather than on military targets. All major powers, along with Iran and North Korea, have developed and deployed cyberweapons designed to disrupt and destroy major elements of an adversary’s key economic systems, such as power grids, financial systems, and transportation networks. As noted, Russia has infiltrated the U.S. electrical grid, and it is widely believed that the United States has done the same in Russia.12 The Pentagon has also devised a plan known as “Nitro Zeus,” intended to immobilize the entire Iranian economy and so force it to capitulate to U.S. demands or, if that approach failed, to pave the way for a crippling air and missile attack.13

The danger here is that economic attacks of this sort, if undertaken during a period of tension and crisis, could lead to an escalating series of tit-for-tat attacks against ever more vital elements of an adversary’s critical infrastructure, producing widespread chaos and harm and eventually leading one side to initiate kinetic attacks on critical military targets, risking the slippery slope to nuclear conflict. For example, a Russian cyberattack on the U.S. power grid could trigger U.S. attacks on Russian energy and financial systems, causing widespread disorder in both countries and generating an impulse for even more devastating attacks. At some point, such attacks “could lead to major conflict and possibly nuclear war.”14

### 1NC --- K

K Capitalism

#### The antitrust ag narrative is a lie- breaking up ag empowers wealthy, conservative, and white mid-size farmers invested in industrial ag BUT does nothing for farm*workers* that are key to resist it- only the alt solves

Rosenberg, 21 -- Harvard Food Law and Policy Clinic visiting scholar

[Nathan, professor at the University of Iowa College of Law, and Bryce Stucki, journalist, "Don’t Trust the Antitrust Narrative: Farmers Benefit from Industrial Ag. Workers Do Not.," Jacobin, 6-9-2021, https://www.jacobinmag.com/2021/06/antitrust-farmers-farmworkers-exploitation-agribusiness-low-pay-dangerous-working-conditions, accessed 8-11-2021]

Don’t Trust the Antitrust Narrative: Farmers Benefit from Industrial Ag. Workers Do Not.

Most farmers in the US are wealthy and benefit from industrial agriculture. Farmworkers are not — and they’ll be the ones to democratize the agriculture system.

The antitrust critique of industrial agriculture dominates discussions of the farm economy in progressive media and policy circles.

In a fiery attack on Joe Biden’s agricultural team during the 2020 campaign, David Dayen argued that cattle ranchers, hog farmers, and crop producers are all at the mercy of corporate middlemen like Cargill and Bayer, who exert excessive control over the industry and bend farmers to their will. In her 2020 book Break ’Em Up, Zephyr Teachout uses the metaphor of “chickenization” to compare the plight of chicken farmers forced to use the feed supplied by Tyson to rideshare drivers who must accept Uber’s rate cuts. “Some of the biggest Fortune 500 companies may be in agriculture and are making huge profits,” Teachout writes, “but farmers are poor and insecure.”

The antitrust movement is not wrong to focus on the power of corporations: agribusiness has helped transform huge swathes of the globe into biological wastelands, depopulated the countryside, and created a class of hyper-exploited workers. But the standard antitrust analysis overlooks how much US farmers benefit from, and are invested in, the current system.

Farmworkers’ low pay and dangerous work conditions, meanwhile, put them in direct conflict with farmers. They have long led fights for environmental and labor reforms — and the industry’s dependence on their labor gives them potentially enormous bargaining power. They — not farmers — will be at the forefront of any effort to democratize agriculture.

Affluent Farmers

Most farmers in the United States today enjoy high incomes and wealth. The median farm household has a total income 21 percent higher than the overall median household and 75 percent higher than the rural median. Ninety-seven percent of farm households boast a higher net worth than the median household, and the median farm household has a nonfarm net wealth 2.5 times higher than the median household and a total net wealth nine times higher (both of these figures account for debts).

The general farm economy is also strong. Despite innumerable reports that use total farm income to argue US farmers are in crisis, per farm net income has rarely been better. Five of the ten best farm income years since the Great Depression have come in the last decade.

How, then, do antitrust writers produce so much data to suggest that farmers are poor? Most often, they misinterpret numbers that require a great deal more context. One of the most common antitrust arguments is that the farmer’s share of the food dollar has fallen from 37 cents in 1980 to around 15 cents today. This is true — though the share hasn’t changed much since at least 1993 — but total spending on food is up and the number of farms is down. The upshot: farm revenues are at near record levels today.

Antitrust writers also often use summary statistics skewed by the Department of Agriculture’s idiosyncratic definition of “farm.” David Dayen writes that “more than half of all farm households are losing money.” But the USDA’s Census of Agriculture, the source of many such figures, includes an enormous number of “farms” that do very little farming, if any at all.

After the USDA’s constituency of farmers declined sharply after World War II — and along with it, the department’s influence — it began to liberalize its definition of “farm,” counting rural properties with no agricultural production at all as farm operations when they are deemed capable of producing $1,000 in sales. If you have a hundred acres of grass and woodland, a fifth of an acre of fruit-bearing trees, or a fifteenth of an acre of berries — as many wealthy rural residents do — you’re a “farmer” according to USDA.

Almost a quarter of the operations in the 2017 census did not sell any farm products whatsoever. Though the census reports around two million agricultural operations, two-thirds of these, according to the best available data, are retiree or “lifestyle” farms. Unsurprisingly, they drag down aggregate measures of farm income.

Farm organizations portray low- or zero-sales farms as low-income families struggling to get back into agriculture. In reality, most of these farms are owned by wealthy rural and exurban residents who have no interest in farming as a business.

The median household with a “residence” farm — a category that makes up almost all small-scale farms and the majority of all farms — lost $1,600 in farm income in 2019. But these same households, at the median, take in more than $100,000 in total income and hold around $450,000 in net nonfarm wealth — about four times the median US household. As journalist Maggie Koerth put it in a 2016 investigative report, most small farmers in the agricultural census “aren’t the farms of the poor; they’re the yards of the upper-middle-class.”

Farm households have significantly higher net worth than non-farm households. With only non-farm assets and debts included, the median residence farm household, which families tend to own for lifestyle reasons, has about 2.5 times as much net wealth as the median white household and 22 times as much as the median black household. With farm wealth included, the median residence farm has almost 5 times as much wealth as the median household. Commercial farms, which are responsible for the vast majority of all farm production, have an astronomical net wealth of $2.7 million — about 130 times that of the median black household. Almost all farmers, meanwhile, are white.

The few farms that do engage in market production tend to make boatloads of money. Only about 340,000 farms, 80 percent of them family-owned, accounted for 90 percent of sales in 2012. These are what USDA calls “farm businesses,” excluding so-called “low sales farms,” which churn out almost no agricultural products. Even farm businesses with “moderate sales” boast a median farm income of $46,000, a median household income of $95,000, and a median net wealth of $1.8 million. “Midsize” farms make a median of $102,000 off farming and have a total net wealth of $2.4 million. These figures shoot through the roof for larger operations.

What About Debt?

Many readers will be surprised to read that farmers have so much wealth, since antitrust analysts and journalists often point out that total farm debt is at an all-time high. What they don’t mention — in addition to not adjusting for inflation — is that farm assets have increased at even higher rates.

Farms also often have substantial nonfarm wealth they can draw on when their incomes dip. The net wealth figures cited throughout this piece account for both debts and inflation, while the total wealth figures account for nonfarm wealth.

Animal farmers, who figure prominently in the conventional antitrust narrative, are no exception to the general rule of farmer affluence. David Dayen, in Monopolized: Life in the Age of Corporate Power, writes that “a 2013 Pew report noted that 71 percent of all chicken farmers earn incomes below the poverty line.” Zephyr Teachout uses the same figure in Break ’Em Up, as does the Open Markets Institute in an oft-cited report.

The source for this figure appears to be an unpublished 2001 report that found 71 percent of households whose only source of income is a chicken farm were in poverty. The comparable number for today is not readily available, but data from the USDA (obtained for this article) show that even the lowest-sales broiler farm businesses boast a median household income of $69,000 and a net wealth of over $1 million. The figures are similar for cattle and hog farmers.

None of this is to say that there aren’t chicken farmers, dairy farmers, and some other farmers who struggle. But the numbers tell us that farmers are overwhelmingly wealthy and overwhelmingly conservative. Studies of campaign contributions have concluded that agriculture is among the most conservative industries, and a poll last year found 80 percent of farmers approved of Donald Trump.

The story is quite different for farmworkers.

Exploited Farmworkers

Farmworkers perform most of the labor in US agriculture, yet they are relegated to a second-class status. A special tabulation we received from the USDA shows that farmworkers work 60 percent of the hours on the farms that account for 90 percent of all agricultural production, while earning a fraction of the money. Farmers may only earn 15 cents of each food dollar, but farmworkers receive only 1.2 cents — and split those cents among more people, since there are far more farmworkers than farmers.

Data on farmworkers in animal production is patchy, but an expert who studies farm labor in California found they may earn about $30,000 per year. Crop workers, meanwhile, have a median annual income of $17,500 to $20,000 and a third have family incomes below the poverty line.

A leading expert estimates two-thirds are undocumented. They often lack safe drinking water, toil under body-destroying labor conditions, and are exposed to dangerous levels of pesticides (at much higher levels than farmers). With no hope to purchase enough land to enter commercial farming, researcher Philip L. Martin writes, they labor in “an apartheid industry.”

And when things go wrong, farmworkers are often offered up as scapegoats. In the rare instance that authorities prosecute animal abuse on agricultural operations, it is almost always farmworkers who are punished. A familiar pattern has emerged when animal rights organizations release videos of feedlot animal abuse: owners express their shock and dismay, workers are fired, and local prosecutors charge those workers with animal abuse. The owners are not held criminally liable despite creating the working conditions that lead to such abuse.

Many large farms also do their hiring through subcontractors that use the threat of deportation to keep wages down and unions out. While some farmers feel pressure from companies like Bayer, farmworkers feel a much more acute pressure from farmers themselves.

The farm lobby and other conservative interests work hard to keep farmworkers under their thumb. Recently, they pushed to expand the H-2A visa program — which President Trump agreed to — a program many farmworkers and organizers compare to slavery.

Farmworkers with an H-2A visa must stay with their employers and risk deportation if they complain. A 2020 study found that 38 percent of Department of Labor investigations of agricultural operations uncovered H-2A violations, while a 2020 analysis of one hundred interviews with H-2A workers found that 94 percent had suffered three or more “serious legal violations,” which included “seriously substandard housing,” “verbal threats,” and significant wage theft.”

And perhaps most perversely, many farmworkers come to the United States in the first place because American foreign policy — trade deals, coups, and other meddling — destabilized their homes and drove them out in search of decent wages.

Class Conflict in the Fields

The antitrust movement is aware of many of these problems of worker exploitation and will readily concede the need for greater labor protections. But their unmistakable focus is on farmers, which has led them to endorse a trickle-down theory in which farmers, post-trust-busting, will grant their workers a cut of the extra profits.

According to antitrust advocates Sandeep Vaheesan and Claire Kelloway, “Reducing the oppressive buyer power of massive retailers like Walmart, and dominant meat processors, like Tyson, would help return a larger share of the food dollar to producers, and, by extension, their workers.” This sounds logical — if farmers had more money, they’d have more of it to give to their workers — but it quickly falls apart under scrutiny.

Farmers have plenty of income to share with their workers already, yet, as private businesses are wont to do, they share as little of it as they can. When profits spiked in the mid-2000s, wages didn’t budge. When they jumped again in the early 2010s, wages rose only a modest amount, with the largest hikes actually coming after farm income dipped again. Philip L. Martin, the scholar of farm labor, attributes a recent uptick in wages to a decline in immigration and state-level increases in the minimum wage, rather than generosity among hiring managers.

Agricultural workers don’t need wealthier bosses, they need more rights — to unionize, to be free of harassment and mistreatment, to decent food and housing, and to collectively own the land they work.

The antitrust approach also does little to solve more fundamental problems in agriculture. In 1524, the German peasant leader and preacher Thomas Müntzer lambasted the nobility for taking living creatures as their private property. He wrote, outraged, “that all creatures have been turned into property, the fish in the water, the birds in the air, the plants on the earth — all living things must also become free.”

Karl Marx approvingly cited Müntzer three hundred twenty years later, when he argued that capitalism not only degrades how we relate to each other, but also how we relate to nature. As long as we treat living things as commodities, neither they, nor we, will be free.

A programmatic path to the liberation of all things is beyond the scope of this essay — instead, we offer a critique. Antitrust enforcement can be a useful and even necessary tool at times. With at least two-thirds of farmland in the hands of the same wealthy owners responsible for 90 percent of sales, the antitrust movement would be well-served to renew calls for land reform that were popular with earlier US agrarian and left-populist movements.

But when antitrust proponents use concentration to explain all the ills of agriculture, they distort reality. The break ’em up response to industrial agriculture may distribute human and animal misery more evenly (at best), but it does not address the root of this misery: exploitation.

The standard antitrust analysis posits that tending to the needs of a small, highly conservative, and well-off constituency will ultimately benefit their workers and society. This is a mistake. Not only are there far more farmworkers than farmers — at least 2.5 times as many as there are farm businesses — farmers are already at the forefront of movements against environmental abuses and labor violations by their employers: that is to say, farmers.

In recent years, farmworkers and their families have won collective bargaining rights in New York State, a new union in Washington, and safer pesticide regulations throughout the country, despite massive institutional and legal disadvantages. Still, farmworkers lack basic labor protections in most of the country, much less the kind of extravagant public support that farmers receive.

Farmworkers understand that the size of a farm tells us next to nothing about its labor or environmental practices. As Margaret Gray and others have documented, smaller-scale and local farms often have among the worst working conditions and wages. Instead of idealizing yeoman farmers, we must fight for a future where we collectively hold the land together, and farmworkers labor for no one but themselves. Only they have the ability, through withholding and redirecting their labor, to shut down and reshape food production in the United States.

Antitrust writers argue that breaking up agribusiness will help farmers and farmworkers alike. They dream of a cross-class alliance, but deny the intense conflict already with us, playing out every day in fields and farmhouses across the country.

#### Capitalism is terminally unsustainable and at a turning point – reinforcing structures causes extinction and turns their impacts.

* TCC = Transnational Capitalist Class, TNS = Transnational State

Robinson 20 [William I. Robinson, American professor of sociology at the University of California, Santa Barbara, “The Global Police State,” 2020, Pluto Press, EA]

But the globalization boom of the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries was short-lived. The global financial meltdown of 2008 marked the onset of a new structural crisis of global capitalism, one that opens the possibility for systemic change. Karl Marx was the first to identify crisis as immanent to capitalism and there is a vast literature on capitalist crisis.11 Here I identify three types of crisis. Cyclical crises, or recessions, occur about every ten years in the capitalist system and typically last some 18 months. These comprise the so-called “business cycle.” There were recessions in the early 1980s, the early 1990s, and the early 2000s. “Structural crises,” so called because the only way out of crisis is to restructure the system, occur approximately every 40–50 years. A new wave of colonialism and imperialism resolved (that is, displaced) the first recorded structural crisis of the 1870s and 1880s. The next structural crisis, the Great Depression of the 1930s, was resolved through a new type of redistributive capitalism, referred to as the “class compromise” of Fordism-Keynesianism, social democracy, New Deal capitalism, and so on (more on this below). As we have seen, capital responded to the next structural crisis, that of the 1970s, by going global. Each of these major episodes of structural crisis have presented this potential for systemic change. Historically, each has involved the breakdown of state legitimacy, escalating class and social struggles, and military conflicts. In the past, structural crises have led to a restructuring that includes new institutional arrangements, class relations, and accumulation activities that eventually resulted in a restabilization of the system and renewed capitalist expansion. Yet a new period of far-reaching restructuring through digitalization appears to be under way at this time. Before we return to this new wave of restructuring, let us focus on the nature of the current crisis, which shares aspects of earlier system-wide structural crises of the 1880s, the 1930s, and the 1970s. Yet there are several interrelated dimensions to the current crisis that I believe sets it apart from these earlier ones and suggest that a simple restructuring of the system will not lead to its restabilization—that is, our very survival requires now a revolution against global capitalism. Above all is the existential crisis posed by the ecological limits to the reproduction of the system. We have already passed tipping points in climate change, the nitrogen cycle, and diversity loss. For the first time ever, human conduct is intersecting with and fundamentally altering the earth system in such a way that threatens to bring about a sixth mass extinction.12 While capitalism cannot be held solely responsible for the ecological crisis, it is difficult to image that the environmental catastrophe can be resolved within the capitalist system given capital’s implacable impulse to accumulate and its accelerated commodification of nature. The ecological dimensions of global crisis have been brought to the forefront of the global agenda by the worldwide environmental justice movement. Communities around the world have come under the escalating repression of a global police state as they face off against transnational corporate plunder of their environment and demand environmental justice and action by governments to avert the climate catastrophe. And climate change refugees, who are likely to run into the hundreds of millions in the years ahead, are vilified by racist and neo-fascist forces and repressed by a global police state. This accelerated commodification of nature points to another underlying dimension of the current crisis. We are reaching limits to the extensive expansion of capitalism, in the sense that there are no longer any new territories of significance to integrate into world capitalism and new spaces to commodify are drying up. The capitalist system is by its nature expansionary. In each earlier structural crisis, the system went through a new round of extensive expansion—that is, incorporating new territories and populations into it—from waves of colonial conquest in earlier centuries, to the integration in the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries of the former socialist bloc countries, China, India and other areas that had been marginally outside the system. There are no longer any new territories to integrate into world capitalism. At the same time, the privatization of education, health, utilities, basic services, and public lands are turning those spaces in global society that were outside of capital’s direct control into “spaces of capital,” so that intensive expansion—that is, the commodification of what were non-commodified resources and activities—is reaching depths never before seen. Commodification refers to the process of turning people, the things that people produce, and nature into things that are privately owned, have a monetary value, and that can be bought and sold. Capitalism by its nature must constantly expand intensively by commodifying more and more of the world. What is there left to commodify? Where can the system now expand? New spaces have to be violently cracked open and the peoples in these spaces must be repressed by a global police state. But what does exhaustion of spaces for extensive and intensive expansion imply for the reproduction of the system? The sheer magnitude of the means of violence and social control is unprecedented, as well as the magnitude and concentrated—and increasingly privatized—control over these means of violence along with the means of global communication and the production and circulation of symbols, images, and knowledge. As I will discuss in more detail in Chapters 2 and 3, computerized wars, drone warfare, robot soldiers, bunkerbuster bombs, satellite surveillance, cyberwar, spatial control technology, and so forth, have changed the face of warfare, and more generally, of systems of social control and repression. We have arrived at the panoptical surveillance society, a point brought home by revelations of the defector from the U.S. National Security Agency (NSA), Edward Snowden, that the NSA monitored virtually every communication on the planet. It is no exaggeration to say that we are now in the age of thought control by those who control global flows of communication, information, and symbolic production. But most frightening is the production and deployment of a new generation of nuclear weapons and the threat of “limited” nuclear war.13 If global crisis leads to a new world war, the destruction would simply be unprecedented. Combined with ecological meltdown, it is difficult to see how humanity could survive such a conflagration. Global capitalism lends itself to escalating inter-national tensions with the potential to spill over into major interstate conflict. But we should not explain these tensions through the outdated nation-state/interstate mode of analysis that attributes such tensions to national rivalry and competition among national capitalist classes for international economic control. Rather, these tensions derive, above all, from an acute political contradiction in global capitalism that I already alluded to above: economic globalization takes places within a nation-state-based system of political authority. Nation-states face a contradiction between the need to promote transnational capital accumulation in their territories and their need to achieve political legitimacy. In the age of capitalist globalization, governments must attract to the national territory transnational corporate and financial investment, which requires providing capital with all the incentives associated with neo-liberalism—downward pressure on wages, deregulation, low or no taxes, privatization, fiscal austerity, and on so— that aggravate inequality, impoverishment, and insecurity for working and popular classes. As a result, states around the world have been experiencing spiraling crises of legitimacy. To put it in more technical terms, there is a contradiction between the accumulation function and the legitimacy function of nation-states. This situation generates bewildering, unstable, and seemingly contradictory politics. It helps explain the rise of far-right and neo-fascist forces that espouse rhetoric of nationalism and protectionism even as they promote neo-liberalism, such as the Trump government in the United States, and has confused some into believing that “deglobalization” is under way as we move backward to an earlier era of national protectionism. In fact, the “old protectionism” of the twentieth century aimed to protect national products and the national capitalist groups that produced them with tariffs and subsidies. The new protectionism—if we could call it that, as the term is extremely misleading and leads to much confusion—aims to create the conditions to attract transnational capital to national territories. Despite its protectionist rhetoric, for instance, the Trump White House called not for locking out foreign investors but for transnational investors from around the world to invest in the United States, enticed by a regressive tax reform, unprecedented deregulation, and some limited tariff walls that would benefit groups from anywhere in the world that establish operations behind them. “America is open for business,” Trump declared at the 2018 meeting of the global elite gathered for the annual conclave of the World Economic Forum (WEF) in Davos, Switzerland: “Now is the perfect time to bring your business, your jobs and your investments to the United States.”14 And the biggest single beneficiary of steel tariffs that Trump imposed in 2018 on imported steel was ArcelorMittal, the Indian-based company that owns majority shares in U.S. Steel.15 Moreover, as we will see later, TCC contingents from countries around the world that appear to be in geopolitical competition are not just heavily invested in global police state but they are cross- and mutually invested in it. More to the point here, economic globalization as it has unfolded within the interstate system generates mounting international and geo-political tensions to the extent that the crisis exacerbates the problem of legitimacy and destabilizes national political systems and elite control. Inter-national tensions must be seen as derivative of the contradiction between the expansion of transnational capital within the framework of the nationstate/inter-state system, in which global capitalism pits nationally constrained workers against one another and sets up the conditions for the TCC to manipulate the crises of state legitimacy and the international tensions generated by this contradiction. The political tensions generated by this contradiction can and do take on the appearance of geo-political competition.16 Will the centrifugal pressures produced by this contradiction undercut the centripetal pressures brought about by economic globalization? Will these centrifugal pressures break out into open, largescale inter-state warfare?17 Will geo-political tensions “overdetermine” the corporate interests of the TCC? We need here to extend the analysis of transnational politics and the TNS in order to understand this dimension of global crisis, especially so considering that it is central to the story of global police state. Transnational elites have been clamoring for more effective TNS institutions, in part, in order to resolve this disjuncture between economic globalization and the nation-state system of political authority. However, the fragmentary and highly emergent nature of TNS apparatuses makes the effort problematic given both the dispersal of formal political authority across many nation-states and the loose nature of TNS apparatuses with no center or formal constitution. The more “enlightened” elite representatives of the TCC are now searching for ways to develop a more powerful TNS, one that could impose regulation on the global market and certain controls on unbridled global accumulation. They are seeking transnational mechanisms of “governance” that would allow the global ruling class to rein in the anarchy of the system in the interests of saving global capitalism from itself and from radical challenges from below—from both an insurgent Left and extreme Right. More than in any other forum, the politicized strata of the transnational elite comes together in the activities of the WEF, a “network of networks” for the TCC and the transnational elite that holds its famed annual meeting in Davos. Indeed, it is not for nothing that “Davos Man” has been used to describe the new global ruling class. WEF founder and Executive Chairman Klaus Schwab called in 2008 for renovated forms of “global leadership” by the TCC: Whether it is poverty in Africa or the Haze over Southeast Asia, an increasing number of problems require bilateral, regional or global solutions and, in many cases, the mobilization of more resources than any single government can marshal … The limits of political power are increasingly evident. The lack of global leadership is glaring, not least because the existing global governance institutions are hampered by archaic conventions and procedures devised, in some instances, at the end of World War II. Sovereign power still rests with national governments, but authentic and effective global leadership has yet to emerge. Meanwhile, public governance at the local, national, regional, and international levels has weakened. Even the best leaders cannot operate successfully in a failed system.18 But if the transnational elite wants a stronger TNS in order to cement the TCC’s rule and stabilize the system, it has not been able to resolve the contradictory mandate it has accorded to the TNS. On the one hand, the TNS sets out to promote the conditions for capitalist globalization; on the other, it tries to resolve the myriad problems globalization creates: economic crisis, poverty, environmental degradation, chronic political instability, and military conflict. The TNS has had great difficulty addressing these issues because of the dispersal of formal political authority across many nation-states. To reiterate, TNS apparatuses are fragmentary; there is no center or formal constitution, and there is certainly no transnational enforcement capacity. These TNS apparatuses have not been able to substitute for a leading nation-state—what the international relations literature refers to as a “hegemon”—with enough power and authority to organize and stabilize the system, much less to impose regulations on transnational capital. The politicized strata of the TCC and transnationally oriented elites and organic intellectuals, including those who staff TNS institutions, attempt to define the long-term interests of the system and to develop policies, projects, and ideologies to secure these interests. Since the specific interests of the various components of the global power bloc are divergent, it is the TNSs’ role to unify and organize the various classes and fractions to uphold their long-term political interests against the threat of the exploited and oppressed classes around the world. But the inability of the TNS to impose coherence and regulation on transnational accumulation and to stabilize the system is also due to the vulnerability of the TCC as a class group in terms of its own internal disunity and fractionation, and its ~~blind~~ pursuit of immediate accumulation—that is, of its immediate and particular profit-seeking interests over the long-term or general interests of the class. There is of course a profound social dimension of global crisis. In these times of unprecedented worldwide inequalities, capitalist crisis breaks apart the social fabric and devastates communities everywhere. Billions of people around the world face struggles to survive from one day to the next, with no guarantee that they will succeed in this struggle (indeed, many are not and many more won’t). In academic terms we could call this a crisis of social reproduction, but this phrase does nothing to capture the depths of misery that poverty, disease, un- and underemployment, food insecurity, social exclusion, racist, xenophobic, and other forms of social violence into which billions are thrust on a daily basis, or to the persecution that they face as migrants, refugees, surplus labor, and so on. The next two chapters will take up these matters. However, let us point out that the social crisis is decidedly not a crisis for capital, and may even help it to reproduce its rule, until or unless it leads to mass rebellion that threatens the ruling groups’ control.

#### The alternative is a class-based movement towards socialism – only rejecting capitalist ideology allows for sustainable development.

Foster 19 [John Bellamy Foster, professor of sociology at the University of Oregon, “Capitalism Has Failed—What Next?,” 02/01/19, *Monthly Review*, https://monthlyreview.org/2019/02/01/capitalism-has-failed-what-next/, EA]

It may be objected that socialism has been tried and has failed and hence no longer exists as an alternative. However, like the earliest attempts at capitalism in the Italian city-states of the late Middle Ages, which were not strong enough to survive amongst the feudal societies that surrounded them, the failure of the first experiments at socialism presage nothing but its eventual rebirth in a new, more revolutionary, more universal form, which examines and learns from the failures.95 Even in failure, socialism has this advantage over capitalism: it is motivated by the demand for “freedom in general,” rooted in substantive equality and sustainable human development—reflecting precisely those collective social relations, borne of historical necessity and the unending struggle for human freedom, crucial to human survival in our time.96

The great conservative economist Joseph Schumpeter, who, as Austrian finance minister in Red Vienna, had allied himself for a time with the socialist government and found himself attacked on all sides, once wrote that capitalism would perish not because of “the weight of economic failure,” but rather because its “very success” in pursuing its narrow economic ends, had undermined the sociological foundations of its existence. Capitalism, Schumpeter exclaimed, “‘inevitably’ creates conditions in which it will not be able to live and which strongly point to socialism as its heir apparent.”97 He was, it turns out, in many ways correct, though not entirely in the way he expected. The global development of monopoly capitalism and financialization spearheaded by the very same counterrevolutionary neoliberalism that first arose in response to Red Vienna in the interwar years—at a time when Schumpeter himself was a major actor—has now undermined the material bases, not so much of capitalism itself, but of global society and planetary ecology. The result has been the emergence of an “atmosphere of almost universal hostility” to the prevailing social order, though, playing out in the confused context of the present, less as opposition to capitalism itself than to neoliberalism.98

It is capitalism’s undermining of the very basis of human existence that will eventually compel the world’s workers and peoples to seek new roads forward. An inclusive, class-based movement toward socialism in this century will open up the possibility of qualitative new developments that the anarchy of the capitalist-market society with its monopolistic competition, extreme inequality, and institutionalized greed cannot possibly offer.99 This includes the development of a socialist technology, in which both the forms of technology utilized and the purposes to which they are put are channeled in social directions, as opposed to individual and class gain.100 It introduces the prospect of long-term democratic planning at all levels of society, allowing decisions to be made and distributions to occur outside the logic of the cash nexus.101 Socialism, in its most radical form, is about substantive equality, community solidarity, and ecological sustainability; it is aimed at the unification—not simply division—of labor.

Once sustainable human development, rooted not in exchange values, but in use values and genuine human needs, comes to define historical advance, the future, which now seems closed, will open up in a myriad ways, allowing for entirely new, more qualitative, and collective forms of development.102 This can be seen in the kinds of needed practical measures that could be taken up, but which are completely excluded under the present mode of production. It is not physical impossibility, or lack of economic surplus, most of which is currently squandered, that stands in the way of the democratic control of investment, or the satisfaction of basic needs—clean air and water, food, clothing, housing, education, health care, transportation, and useful work—for all. It is not the shortage of technological know-how or of material means that prevents the necessary ecological conversion to more sustainable forms of energy.103 It is not some inherent division of humanity that obstructs the construction of a New International of workers and peoples directed against capitalism, imperialism, and war.104 All of this is within our reach, but requires pursuing a logic that runs counter to that of capitalism.

Humanity, Karl Marx wrote, “inevitably sets itself only such tasks as it is able to solve, since closer examination will always show that the problem itself arises only when the material conditions for its solution are already present or at least in the course of formation.”105 The very waste and excess of today’s monopoly-finance capitalism, together with the development of new means of communication that allow for greater human coordination, planning, and democratic action than ever before, suggest that there are countless paths forward to a world of substantive equality and ecological sustainability once the world is freed from the fetters of capital.106

## Regional Food

### 1NC --- Turn

#### Ag monopolies and vertical integration are necessary to an efficient food system.

Nordhaus '21 - founder and executive director of the Breakthrough Institute  
[Ted and Dan Blaustein-Rejto; Apr 18; "Big Agriculture Is Best;" https://foreignpolicy.com/2021/04/18/big-agriculture-is-best/]

Much of the criticism of big agriculture focuses on the monopolistic power of food processors like Archer-Daniels-Midland and Tyson Foods. But the bigger problem is arguably that there is too little vertical integration of food processors with food producers and landowners. Today, big food processors are able to take an outsized share of the profits from the food system while pushing the economic risk onto those further down the supply chain. Many large farmers, meanwhile, lease rather than own much of the land they farm, with much of America’s farmland owned by absentee landowners.

The resulting economic arrangements are rife with what economists call principal-agent problems. Many farmers don’t have incentives to invest in the long-term productivity of the land they farm because they don’t own it nor do they have the means to invest in cutting-edge capital equipment and technology.

These problems are exacerbated by the fact that many farms are family-owned but have no prospect for generational succession, as children continue to choose to pursue greener non-pastures off the farm. So for farmers who don’t own the land they farm, don’t have heirs to pass the farm on to, or both, investing time and money in technology and practices to improve land productivity over the long term does not make sense.

The prospect that a few large corporations could ultimately not only process but own much of America’s farmland and grow much of its food will strike many as fundamentally wrong. But it is likely where we are heading one way or another, as farming has always been a tough business to stay in, much less get into, and fewer and fewer Americans have any interest in doing so.

Vertical integration might bring significant benefits. Big agricultural corporations would have significantly greater incentive to invest resources into the long-term improvement of the land they own and farm, implement evidence-based farming practices, and spend on capital-intensive technology.

Large companies are also, counterintuitively, more responsive to demands for social responsibility, not less so. It is large, multinational corporations, not smaller regional operators, for instance, that have been willing to make zero-deforestation commitments in places like Brazil. That’s because, even though they can leverage their size and economic power to thwart reform, they are also easier to target, pressure, and regulate than more decentralized industries.

For these reasons, a food system that is bigger, more consolidated, and more vertically integrated might actually deliver better social and environmental outcomes than the one we have today. Either way, big farms and big agriculture are here to stay. They are a fundamental feature of global modernity, not a conspiracy by capitalists and corporations to poison people or the land.

Ultimately, improving the U.S. food system will require, first, appreciating it for the social, economic, and technological marvel that it is. It feeds 330 million Americans and many millions more around the world. It has liberated almost all of us from lives of hard agricultural labor and deep agrarian poverty. It has allowed forests to return across much of the United States while also sparing forests in many other parts of the world. It does all this while being extraordinarily efficient environmentally. A better food system will build on these blessings, not abandon them.

#### Only intensification can prevent zoonotic disease outbreaks and preserve biodiversity.

Smith '20 - Food and Ag Analyst @ Breakthrough   
[Alex; Apr 13; "To Combat Pandemics, Intensify Agriculture;" https://thebreakthrough.org/issues/food/zoonosis]

A number of activists and opinion writers have recently argued that SARS-CoV-2, the virus that causes COVID-19, can be traced back to “industrial” and “intensive” agriculture. In a Sierra Magazine piece titled “Blame It on the Farm Too,” Ashia Ajani points a finger at “Western-influenced farming practices” as a main cause of our current zoonotic outbreak and possible further outbreaks.

But these claims offer no explicit argument for how a different form of agriculture — outside of calls to completely eliminate meat consumption — would reduce risk, and they often conflate intensive animal agriculture with intensive agriculture writ large. More fundamentally, these claims point in the wrong direction. If anything, intensification is the solution to reducing the risk of zoonotic disease, not the problem, mainly because it addresses the real underlying causes of zoonosis: land-use change and food insecurity.

First, we should put to rest the argument that COVID-19 has direct ties to factory farming. As most of us know, SARS-CoV-2 has been connected to a wet market in Wuhan, China where wildlife like pangolins, civets, and more were sold alongside butchered meat and other foods. Like SARS before it, the novel coronavirus is assumed to have its origins in bats, but was spread from bats to an intermediary host — potentially a pangolin — before infecting humans.

Intensification is the solution to reducing the risk of zoonotic disease, not the problem, mainly because it addresses the real underlying causes of zoonosis.

Many point to the conditions of the wildlife at the wet market — cages of live animals stacked on top of other live animals — as a perfect storm for zoonotic disease outbreaks, but the underlying cause is the consumption of wildlife. And as Elizabeth Maruma Mrema, the acting executive secretary of the UN Convention on Biological Diversity, explained to The Guardian, the hunger — often literally starvation — that drives consumption of wildlife ought to be cut off at the source, and until we can provide alternatives to wildlife trade and consumption, the problem will persist.

For some, the practice of wildlife consumption in China has direct links to the rise of industrial agriculture in the last quarter of the twentieth century. But the consumption of wildlife and exotic animals in China is historically rooted in food insecurity and, in fact, a failure to industrialize agriculture. According to journalist Brian Barth, Chinese consumption of wildlife stems from the 1970s decision to conclude the Maoist collective farming experiment — an experiment that saw severe famine and food shortages over the previous decades. The goal, instead, was to industrialize agriculture, but a lack of resources and funding meant that the state could not supply rural farmers with the means to industrialize and take advantage of economies of scale. Instead, those farmers who could not benefit from agricultural industrialization took up exotic animal farming as a new source of income.

As Chinese agriculture intensified throughout the following decades, exotic animals remained a part of certain regional diets. Up until the outbreak of the novel coronavirus, these animals were eaten both because of their cultural significance for traditional Chinese medicine, and as a means of demonstrating upward mobility and wealth.

The most important factor in the development of new zoonotic diseases is land-use change.

There is broad agreement in the epidemiological and virological studies of zoonoses that the most important factor in the development of new zoonotic diseases is land-use change. The development of wild lands, whether caused by agricultural extensification, mining, or other factors, simultaneously shrinks the habitat of wildlife and brings that wildlife in close proximity to human settlements. The combination of shrinking habitats, human-wildlife interactions, and food insecurity is a recipe for zoonosis. In West Africa, these three factors combined were responsible for HIV/AIDS and the slew of recent Ebola outbreaks.

Even when food insecurity and the consumption of wildlife are taken out of the equation, land-use change is a powerful driver of zoonotic disease, and has resulted in outbreaks of zoonotic diseases like malaria, yellow fever, dengue fever, Nipah virus, West Nile virus, Zika virus, and Lyme disease. Often, these diseases are transmitted from animals to humans through an intermediary, sometimes an insect (mosquitoes or ticks) and sometimes through livestock that live too close to wildlife populations, as was the case with Nipah.

Because the biggest driver of land-use change is agriculture, “intensive” high-yield agriculture often takes the blame, but the alternative — extensive, low-yield farming — would be worse. To prevent further pandemics, we must do as much as we can to stop land-use change while improving food security. We must, in other words, improve agricultural yields, allowing us to grow more food on less land. So, contrary to what many have asserted, a vital lever for limiting land-use change and providing cheap food for all is not to abandon intensive agriculture, but to intensify it further, especially in the developing world where food insecurity is greatest and where growing populations means rising food demand.

It is thanks to rising yields that farmers, globally, produce about three times the amount of crops while only using 13% more land than in 1950. For example, if yields from cereal production hadn’t increased since 1961, the global agricultural footprint would be 24% larger than it is today — increasing from roughly 50% at current levels to 62% of total habitable land — and would likely have resulted in even deadlier zoonotic outbreaks.

Figure 1, Our World In Data - “Crop Yields”

Alongside reducing deforestation and land-use change and improving food access and security, sustainably intensifying agriculture across the globe would benefit biodiversity by protecting habitats and keeping them from agricultural development. While monoculture means less biodiversity on farmland, the productivity gains of monocropping — and other intensive agricultural practices — allow for the sparing of far greater land that can be used as habitat for wild flora and fauna. Certainly, agricultural intensification alone is not enough to maximize land-sparing benefits, as improved conservation and land policy is needed to minimize rebound effects. But greater productivity is likely the longest lever for achieving ambitious conservation goals.

The spread of intensive agriculture has come with rising nitrogen run-off, methane emissions, and other environmental impacts. These are real problems, but their solution is the continued improvement of intensive systems. In fact, we are already seeing reductions in many environmental impacts from agriculture in countries where intensive agriculture is prevalent, such as the US.

In addition to intensifying agriculture generally, we must manage the risk from animal agriculture in particular. Activists and scientists are correct that reducing animal agriculture, or even eliminating it, would drastically reduce risk of zoonoses. But because the likelihood of a global switch to a plant-based diet is low and would in fact harm the hundreds of millions of smallholder farmers reliant on animal agriculture, we must seek out ways to both intensify animal agriculture and make it safer.

Worries about increased virulence of influenza strains and antibiotic resistance due to poorly managed low-dose usage of antibiotics on intensive animal agriculture are well-founded and downright scary. Alternatively, and potentially more importantly, animal agriculture, even the most intensive forms, requires huge amounts of land for either grazing animals or growing feed. In fact, beef production may be the largest driver of Amazonian deforestation. And, when animal agriculture encroaches on previously unmanaged wildlands, the risk of zoonotic diseases drastically increases as viruses can jump from wild to domesticated animals.

Technology has already helped improve the efficiency, sanitation, and health of cattle, pork, and chicken in the United States — for example, advances in veterinary and farm engineering have greatly reduced disease rates among american pigs — but there are many stones left unturned. Increased R&D, improved regulatory practices, and greater transparency are all clearly needed to ensure global meat production can be efficient, sustainable, and biosecure.

With our global population set to increase by close to 3 billion by 2050, we must strive to construct a world that can provide food, shelter, and livelihoods to all 10 billion people, while reducing risk of pandemics akin to what we see today. Simply, the only way forward is forward. We must continue to develop agricultural innovations that can allow for increased intensification, and we must give these innovations global reach. It does not work to just intensify agricultural production in developed countries, given the dual role of land-use change and food insecurity. To combat the main drivers of zoonotic diseases, we must sustainably intensify our food system, not pine for a romanticized and inefficient production system that brings people and wild animals in closer contact.

#### Reducing the amount of land needed for farming is necessary to prevent extinction.

Lynas ‘16 - visiting fellow at Cornell University’s College of Agriculture and Life Sciences   
[Mark, "Peak farmland is an ecological imperative," Dec 18, https://thebreakthrough.org/index.php/issues/the-future-of-food/responses-is-precision-agriculture-the-way-to-peak-cropland/peak-farmland-is-an-ecological-imperative]

Along with rapidly reducing greenhouse gas emissions, reaching 'peak farmland' is probably the world's most important environmental objective. However, it is far less well-known, and is not advocated as a target to my knowledge by any major environmental organization. The reason for this is doubtless because most of the agricultural policies long advocated by the green movement would serve to take us further away from peak farmland rather than towards it. It should be fairly obvious why peaking farmland expansion is important. Biodiversity loss ranks alongside climate change as an existential threat to the Earth's ecological systems, and conversion of land to agriculture and the resultant loss of habitat is in turn the greatest single threat to biodiversity. There is no prospect of sparing large areas of wilderness from the curse of the plough without halting the conversion of nature to human-oriented agriculture. It's either peak farmland or zero rainforest: our choice. And it is not just biodiversity on the line. When a team of scientists led by Johan Rockstrom in 2009 proposed a set of 'planetary boundaries' for avoiding damaging interference in the operations of the Earth system, they noted that majority of these proposed boundaries were significantly affected by farming: biodiversity, climate, nitrogen, water use, and so on. Making farming sustainable is therefore critical for planetary health in a wider sense than just climate or wildlife. Unfortunately, ideology—most clearly in the religion of organic and the cult of the 'natural'—serves mainly to obscure what needs to be done to achieve peak farmland. Organic farming has some direct soil and ecological benefits, but these are far outweighed by the fact that yields are significantly lower than in conventional systems: more farmland must therefore be brought into cultivation to produce the same overall harvest of food. There is a robust scientific consensus about this finding, which is supported by numerous meta-reviews. One recent innovation might have served to make organic agriculture viable—the harnessing of the power of biology, via crop genetics, as a disruptive technology to replace external inputs from agrochemicals. However, organic believers at an early stage decided that genetic engineering was an 'unnatural' technological innovation and therefore should be ruled out a priori. Ever since, various organic enthusiasts have tried to stop any cultivation of genetically modified crops elsewhere on the supposed basis that these crops might 'contaminate' their supposedly pure and natural (but lower-yielding) harvest. Genetic engineering can be thought of as biological precision agriculture. A single DNA sequence can be added to the genome of a crop to confer resistance to insect pests or fungal infections. This means, all other things remaining equal, that the insecticides or fungicides that would otherwise have been sprayed to protect the crop are no longer necessary. Drought tolerance as a trait can reduce the need for irrigation, while nitrogen efficiency can reduce fertilizer inputs. It was an epochal mistake for the organic movement to reject this technology. In a rational world, GMOs and organic would have made perfect bedfellows. In a 2010 paper in the journal PNAS, Jennifer Burney and colleagues calculated the greenhouse gas savings achieved by modern farming by comparing emissions with a counterfactual low-yield scenario that held technology constant at 1961 levels. They concluded that "the net effect of higher yields has avoided emissions of up to 161 gigatons of carbon since 1961". This is an enormous saving, equivalent to a third of the entire stock of human carbon emissions put into the atmosphere since the industrial revolution. And the land savings were equally stunning, equivalent to 1.7 billion hectares of cropland, an area twice the size of the contiguous United States. Genetic modification in its 'GMO' sense has only contributed a small latter portion to this improving picture—most of the gains were achieved through the earlier Green Revolution and the steady yield additions achieved thereafter. The challenge now is to build on this to both shrink the yield gaps that still bedevil developing countries, keeping them trapped in rural poverty, and to make conventional farming more sustainable in terms of soil conservation, reducing inputs and direct emissions and so on. This means dropping the romantic fantasies so beloved of urban foodies. Instead, in the words of Mark Watney in the movie The Martian, we need to "science the shit out of this".

### 1NC --- Swaine

#### The plan results in a global shift away from intensification – this turns all of their environment internals.

Swain ‘16 - Senior Analyst @ the Breakthrough Institute   
[Marian, "An Outlook on Omnivorism and the Environmental “Hoofprint” of Livestock," Dec 14, https://thebreakthrough.org/index.php/issues/the-future-of-food/the-future-of-meat]

Given the sheer scale of global livestock production, how we produce and consume meat in the future will have a significant impact on our environmental future. However, trends in global demand for meat cannot be disentangled from the production systems used to meet that demand. Extensive systems depend on locally available crop residues for feeds, or natural forage production in grazing areas, which limits their ability to scale up production. As the FAO explains, “Extensive systems are incapable of meeting the surging urban demand in many developing countries, not only in terms of volume but also in sanitary and other quality standards.”72 Intensive systems offer higher productivity and scalability, and as a result, rising demand for meat has historically been coupled with increasing intensification. Certainly, shifting from extensive to intensive livestock production introduces new challenges, and the pace and management of the intensification process will be critical to ensuring positive results for producers and the environment. But if well-managed, intensification in the livestock sector has the capacity to leverage productivity gains that also generate environmental savings, helping to boost protein output while minimizing impacts. Intensification, however, is not automatic or inevitable. Governments can and do promote intensification to increase production as well as improve oversight and management of environmental impacts and health risks. China, for example, has been rapidly intensifying its livestock sector as the country’s population grows and incomes rise.73 The shift towards concentrated production has been actively encouraged by government subsidies, in part to better manage local environmental and health impacts. The experience of bird flu in China demonstrated the manageability of disease control in larger intensive operations, as the majority of bird flu cases occurred in extensive systems.74 Producers running intensive livestock operations have shown remarkable ability to adopt new techniques to boost productivity and reap environmental savings in the process. In the United States, for one, innovations in veterinary science, animal nutrition, and genetics have allowed for major improvements in the environmental performance of modern intensive beef production. Between 1977 and 2007, the land needed for beef production decreased 33%, water use decreased 12%, and the carbon footprint fell 16%.75 These improvements largely resulted from the continued shift towards feedlot finishing as well as from productivity enhancements like selectively breeding for larger animals and using improved feed formulations.76 Farmers and scientists are still working on ways to reduce impacts in commercial livestock production—for example, by experimenting with feed additives to reduce methane emissions from cattle.77 Accelerating the transition from extensive to intensive production should be prioritized in some cases to address environmental concerns. In Brazil, for instance, an explicit policy of intensification for the beef sector could help relieve pressure on land conversion. Most beef production there remains extensive (grazing only), so finishing beef cattle in feedlots would reduce the overall land demand from the cattle sector. Even if the cattle were fed soy grown in Brazil, the overall land use would be smaller than pasture-only cattle rearing. Considering that demand for pasture land is a key driver of deforestation in the Amazon, this shift could have a dramatic impact.78 Trade-offs and environmental impacts will vary by region, so context-specific solutions will be necessary. While feedlot finishing may prove a good option for the United States and Brazil, an arid region like Australia may deem it environmentally preferable to continue with a grazing-based system. Increased intensification in pork and poultry production will increase demand for dedicated feed crops in turn, which will require land-use and agricultural planning to minimize pressure on land conversion and competition with food supply. Managing the concentrated local impacts from intensive systems, like water pollution, will require responsible producers and robust regulation. Looking ahead to the coming decades, continued intensification is likely as developing countries respond to rising demand. Thus, efforts to accelerate the adoption of best practice techniques from intensive management systems will be crucial to boost protein output and leverage environmental savings. No-regrets interventions like optimized breeding, nutrition, and veterinary care can improve animal survival, shorten time to slaughter, and increase productivity, benefiting both producers and the environment. In industrialized countries, ongoing innovations are needed to continue raising the bar for environmental performance in modern intensive systems.

### 1NC --- AT: Heg

#### No impact to complete heg collapse.

Fettweis 18 Christopher J. Fettweis, Political Science Professor at Tulane University. [Psychology of a Superpower: Security and Dominance in US Foreign Policy, Columbia University Press]

How would the system respond? Could the New Peace survive without its policeman? Good counterfactual analysis minimizes the number of both assumptions and alterations of reality. It is also obviously wise to choose relatively simple cases, ones that do not involve many potentially confounding variables. 127 The ramifications of an actual supervolcanic blast would not be contained in the United States; the massive amount of material ejected into the atmosphere would blot out the sun and cause global temperatures to drop for years. To keep this thought experiment manageable, let us imagine a natural disaster that only affects the United States, one resulting in the effective disappearance of U.S. military and political engagement with the rest of the world. The effect of an aloof United States on some regions need not be imagined because it already exists. In South America, the U.S. Southern Command has a minuscule operating budget and no troops to speak of, despite its theoretical “responsibility” for the entire continent. The United States maintains no significant physical presence in Africa or large swaths of Asia. A Yellowstone supereruption would presumably not change security calculations in these areas much at all. Europe would be similarly unaffected, sat least in the short term. The United States currently maintains 95,000 troops from all services in its European Command, none of whom are tasked with maintaining the internal stability of its allies. During the Cold War, U.S. troops did not involve themselves in the domestic conflicts of their host states, unlike their Soviet counterparts. Their job was always to protect Europe from without, not within. The continent is the world’s most stable, its countries the most cooperative, and its people the least martial. It would probably take more than the removal of U.S. troops for ash-cleaning duties to bring back security dilemmas, arms races, and conflict. Borders have hardened, as have norms of conflict resolution. No one can know for sure, of course, but Europe does not seem to be a good candidate for chaos in the absence of the United States. Without the presence of U.S. forces, much of the Middle East would be unstable and chaotic. With the presence of U.S. forces, much of the Middle East is unstable and chaotic. A supervolcano erupting in Wyoming would not have much impact on the security of the world’s most dangerous region. Israel would be just as safe as it was before, since its marked military superiority over all potential rivals is the ultimate guarantor of its security, not U.S. troops or ships. Without the prospect of help from Uncle Sam, the failing governments of Iraq and Libya, as well as the rebels in Syria and our allies in Saudi Arabia, Yemen, Jordan, and elsewhere, would learn to become more self-sufficient. Perhaps they would even make long-term deals with their rivals. It might be good to throw them out of the U.S. nest and encourage them to fly on their own or crash. Fears of a resurgent Iran would be articulated by the usual suspects, no doubt, but both history and the realities of power suggest Tehran would find it hard to dominate its neighbors, even if it had the will to do so. The regions that would be of most concern in such a scenario would be the peripheries of those once and potentially future great powers, Russia and China. To believers in the “deterrence model,” first described by Robert Jervis four decades ago, weakness is provocative, and the post-U.S. world would seem everywhere weak. 128 Moscow and Beijing would attempt to expand their influence, and ultimately perhaps their borders, once they were assured that they would face no pushback from Washington. Perhaps gradual interference in their near-abroads, such as we have already seen in eastern Ukraine, northern Georgia, and the South China Sea, would occur with increasing frequency in the vacuum left by a U.S. withdrawal. While such expansion cannot be ruled out, especially in the long run, large border adjustments would probably not occur in the absence of U.S. power, for least two reasons. First, the removal of American troops would not alter the calculations regarding the costs and benefits of conquest in the twenty-first century. Although absorbing neighbors sometimes paid substantial dividends in the pre–information age, today territory is unrelated to wealth. 129 The people of larger states are not automatically better off than those of small ones. India is not richer than Singapore; Russia would not benefit from invading Ukraine; China would hardly be materially better off if it ruled Taiwan. The other members of the international system might not be able to stop such adventurism militarily, but they can certainly punish it economically. The costs related to invasion and the inevitable problems that arise during occupation would outweigh any possible benefits that may accrue. Conquest in a trading system is profoundly irrational, and the incentives for peace are strong. Rational calculations are not the only motivations for cross-border violence. As Norman Angell argued a century ago, people have to believe that war is not worth the cost before they will forswear it. 130 The quest for glory and prestige has sent many an army into motion over the centuries; Alfred Thayer Mahan responded to Angell’s rationalism a century ago by pointing out that “nations are under no illusion as to the unprofitableness of war itself” but honor often compels them to fight anyway. 131 By 2017, however, those calculations have changed. It is not at all clear that glory still automatically accompanies conquest. The second reason to believe that Russia and China might not dominate their near-abroads in an essentially U.S.-free world is that the behavioral norms of the New Peace discourage aggression. Imperialism invites opprobrium, not admiration. This does not mean that such assaults could not happen—Genghis Khan was unconcerned about opprobrium, for instance, and Vladimir Putin might be too—but surely it is significant that conquest has been all but absent since the Second World War. The unipole is not the only thing restraining potential combatants; both their material and reputational interests do so as well. If and when a catastrophic supervolcanic eruption weakens the United States, other countries would still have substantial interest in maintaining the overlapping network of international economic and political institutions that serve the interests of all members. All would want to see free trade and investment continue unmolested, whether or not the global policeman could punish violators. Most would continue to place some value on international law, human rights, and the UN system. Why any state would want to move backward to a mercantilist time of pure self-help and violence would be difficult to imagine. It is 2017, not 1717. Volcanologists assure us that someday Yellowstone will awaken with terrifying fury. The human and material cost will be immense, but the ramifications for international security may not be as dramatic. While it might take that kind of event to settle the questions concerning hegemonic-stability theory once and for all, we can still use our imaginations to anticipate the kind of reaction that the system would have if the global 911 is taken off the hook. Even more decisively than a Trump superpresidency, a supervolcano eruption would test the New Peace and settle forever debates over the importance of unipolarity. Until then, one can only imagine what the system would be like without the United States. And the smart money would be with those who say that it would probably look pretty much the same, with very small amounts of conflict and warfare, even if few people seem to notice. In the end, what can be definitely said about the relationship between U.S. power and international stability? Probably not much that will satisfy partisans. The pacifying virtue of U.S. hegemony will remain largely an article of faith in some circles in the policy world. Like most beliefs, it will resist alteration by logic and evidence. Beliefs rarely change, so debates rarely end. For those not yet fully converted, however, perhaps it will be significant that corroborating evidence for the relationship is extremely hard to identify. If indeed hegemonic stability exists, it does so without leaving much of a trace. Neither Washington’s spending, nor its interventions, nor its overall grand strategy seem to matter much to the levels of armed conflict around the world (apart from those wars that Uncle Sam starts). The empirical record does not contain much support for the notion that unipolarity and the New Peace are related. At the same time, three common psychological phenomena suggest that hegemonic stability is particularly susceptible to misperception. U.S. leaders probably exaggerate the degree to which their power matters. Researchers will need to look elsewhere to explain why the world has entered the most peaceful period in its history.

#### Leadership’s inevitable and resilient.

Beckley 18 Michael Beckley, International Relations Professor at Tufts University, PhD at Columbia. [Unrivaled: Why America Will Remain the World's Sole Superpower, an addition to the series Cornell Studies in Security Affairs, edited by Robert J. Art, Robert Jervis, and Stephen M. Walt, Cornell University Press]

By most measures, the United States is a mediocre country. It ranks seventh in literacy, eleventh in infrastructure, twenty-eighth in government efficiency, and fifty-seventh in primary education. 1 It spends more on healthcare than any other country, but ranks forty-third in life expectancy, fifty-sixth in infant mortality, and first in opioid abuse. 2 More than a hundred countries have lower levels of income inequality than the United States, and twelve countries enjoy higher levels of gross national happiness. 3 Yet in terms of wealth and military capabilities—the pillars of global power—the United States is in a league of its own. With only 5 percent of the world’s population, the United States accounts for 25 percent of global wealth, 35 percent of world innovation, and 40 percent of global military spending. 4 It is home to nearly 600 of the world’s 2,000 most profitable companies and 50 of the top 100 universities. 5 And it is the only country that can fight major wars beyond its home region and strike targets anywhere on earth within an hour, with 587 bases scattered across 42 countries and a navy and air force stronger than that of the next ten nations combined. 6 According to Yale historian Paul Kennedy, “Nothing has ever existed like this disparity of power; nothing.” The United States is, quite simply, “the greatest superpower ever.” 7 Why is the United States so dominant? And how long will this imbalance of power last? In the following pages, I argue that the United States will remain the world’s sole superpower for many decades, and probably throughout this century. We are not living in a transitional post–Cold War era. Instead, we are in the midst of what could be called the unipolar era—a period as profound as any epoch in modern history. This conclusion challenges the conventional wisdom among pundits, policymakers, and the public. 8 Since the end of the Cold War, scholars have dismissed unipolarity as a fleeting “moment” that would soon be swept away by the rise of new powers. 9 Bookstores feature bestsellers such as The Post-American World and Easternization: Asia’s Rise and America’s Decline; 10 the U.S. National Intelligence Council has issued multiple reports advising the president to prepare the country for multipolarity by 2030;11 and the “rise of China” has been the most read-about news story of the twenty-first century. 12 These writings, in turn, have shaped public opinion: polls show that most people in most countries think that China is overtaking the United States as the world’s leading power. 13 How can all of these people be wrong? I argue that the current literature suffers from two shortcomings that distort peoples’ perceptions of the balance of power. First, the literature mismeasures power. Most studies size up countries using gross indicators of economic and military resources, such as gross domestic product (GDP) and military spending. 14 These indicators tally countries’ resources without deducting the costs countries pay to police, protect, and provide services for their people. As a result, standard indicators exaggerate the wealth and military power of poor, populous countries like China and India—these countries produce vast output and field large armies, but they also bear massive welfare and security burdens that drain their resources. To account for these costs, I measure power in net rather than gross terms. In essence, I create a balance sheet for each country: assets go on one side of the ledger, liabilities go on the other, and net resources are calculated by subtracting the latter from the former. When this is done, it becomes clear that America’s economic and military lead over other countries is much larger than typically assumed—and the trends are mostly in its favor. Second, many projections of U.S. power are based on flawed notions about why great powers rise and fall. Much of the literature assumes that great powers have predictable life spans and that the more powerful a country becomes the more it suffers from crippling ailments that doom it to decline. 15 The Habsburg, French, and British empires all collapsed. It is therefore natural to assume that the American empire is also destined for the dustbin of history. I argue, however, that the laws of history do not apply today. The United States is not like other great powers. Rather, it enjoys a unique set of geographic, demographic, and institutional advantages that translate into a commanding geopolitical position. The United States does not rank first in all sources of national strength, but it scores highly across the board, whereas all of its potential rivals suffer from critical weaknesses. The United States thus has the best prospects of any nation to amass wealth and military power in the decades ahead.

## Rural Development

### 1NC --- Rural

#### Ag’s not key to anything rural---get destroyed by facts and logic.

Packard ’17 [Clark; October; resident fellow and trade policy counsel in the Finance, Insurance and Trade policy department at the R Street Institute, J.D. at the University of South Carolina School of Law; R Street Shorts, “Rural Poverty, Farm Subsidies and The Way Forward,” No. 49]

SNAPSHOT OF FARM EMPLOYMENT

The first problem with the notion that more generous agricultural subsidies will reduce rural poverty is that, in fact, very few Americans are employed in agriculture, even in rural areas. Between 1912 and 2012, during which time the population of the United States more than tripled to 314 million people, the number of hired farmworkers declined significantly—from 3.4 million to slightly more than 1 million.3 Factoring in growth of the U.S. labor market over time helps to underscore just how dramatic the relative decline in the number of farmworkers has been.4 According to a recent study for the Mercatus Center at George Mason University, economist Jayson Lusk found that while 40 percent of Americans worked on farms in 1900, only about 1 percent do today.5

It is also worth noting that, more than any other sector, agricultural employment swings considerably by season. According to the U.S. Agriculture Department (USDA), there were 808,000 farmworkers in January 2011, while in July of that year, the figure stood at 1,184,000.6 Thus, farm work is not a particularly reliable source of full-time, year-round employment. On the other hand, while fewer Americans now work on farms, for those who do, their income is more immune to economic shocks than the broader labor market. During the so-called “Great Recession” of 2007 to 2009, nonfarm wages and salaries fell by 4.7 percent, while farm wages and salaries decreased by a mere 1.5 percent.7

In terms of the ability of the agricultural sector to help alleviate rural poverty, it is first important to note that most U.S. farmworkers actually are employed in metropolitan areas. As Figure 1 demonstrates, only about 45 percent of the total number of farmworkers are employed in rural counties, while the other 55 percent work in urban or suburban counties.

Just as most farmworkers do not work in rural areas, the overwhelming majority of those who do work in rural areas do not work on farms. In fact, only about 6 percent of workers in nonmetro areas are employed on farms.9 While this represents a higher rate of agricultural employment than is found in metro areas, where about 1 percent of workers work on farms, nonmetro employment is considerably higher in such sectors as trade, government, transportation and utilities.10 This is consistent with overall labor-market trends — away from manufacturing and farming and toward a service-based economy.

Accordingly, only a very small segment of those employed in rural areas would benefit from even a perfectly designed agricultural safety net. Regrettably, at a projected cost of about $15 billion a year—which includes the Agricultural Risk Coverage (ARC) and Price Loss Coverage (PLC) programs, as well as the cost11 of federal crop insurance subsidies—the U.S. agricultural safety net is not only far from perfect, but is increasingly unaffordable for taxpayers.

### 1NC – AT: Polarization

#### Hopelessly non-unique.

Gehl ’20 [Katherine and Michael Porter; July-August 2020; Former CEO of Gehl Foods and Founder of the Institute for Political Innovation; Ph.D. and Professor at Harvard University; Harvard Business Review, “Fixing U.S. Politics,” <https://hbr.org/2020/07/fixing-u-s-politics>]

Amid the unprecedented partisanship and gridlock in Washington, DC, Congress appears locked in a permanent battle, incapable of delivering results. It seems to many Americans—and to the rest of the world—that our political system is so irrational and dysfunctional that it’s beyond repair.

True, Republicans and Democrats recently passed major legislation aimed at stabilizing an economy ravaged by the effects of the Covid-19 pandemic. But this should not be mistaken for an encouraging sign about the political system itself. In fact, it reflects a familiar pattern: A semblance of bipartisanship emerges in a national crisis, when the two parties fear mutual-assured electoral destruction if they don’t get something done. They agree on an emergency response and publicly tout their success even as they quietly agree to pass the cost on to future generations. When today’s crisis subsides, Congress will return to business-as-usual political brinksmanship that fails to solve our many other current challenges and prevent future crises.

### 1NC – AT: Cartels

#### Squo solves drug violence --- COVID-19 --- or else they diversify

**Mustian 20** [Jim Mustian and Jake Bleiberg, Associated Press, “‘Cartels are scrambling’: Virus snarls global drug trade,” April 19, 2020, <https://apnews.com/4f0a4ca93cc2fee94d386efb13db31a0>]

NEW YORK (AP) — Coronavirus is dealing a gut punch to the illegal drug trade, paralyzing economies, closing borders and severing supply chains in China that traffickers rely on for the chemicals to make such profitable drugs as methamphetamine and fentanyl.

One of the main suppliers that shut down is in Wuhan, the epicenter of the global outbreak.

Associated Press interviews with nearly two dozen law enforcement officials and trafficking experts found Mexican and Colombian cartels are still plying their trade as evidenced by recent drug seizures but the lockdowns that have turned cities into ghost towns are disrupting everything from production to transport to sales.

Along the 2,000-mile U.S.-Mexico border through which the vast majority of illegal drugs cross, the normally bustling vehicle traffic that smugglers use for cover has slowed to a trickle. Bars, nightclubs and motels across the country that are ordinarily fertile marketplaces for drug dealers have shuttered. And prices for drugs in short supply have soared to gouging levels.

“They are facing a supply problem and a demand problem,” said Alejandro Hope, a security analyst and former official with CISEN, the Mexican intelligence agency. “Once you get them to the market, who are you going to sell to?”

Virtually every illicit drug has been impacted, with supply chain disruptions at both the wholesale and retail level. Traffickers are stockpiling narcotics and cash along the border, and the U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration even reports a decrease in money laundering and online drug sales on the so-called dark web.

#### Cartels won’t provoke US response—they’ll de-escalate the border

**Stewart 11**, former U.S. State Department special agent, “The Buffer Between Mexican Cartels and the U.S. Government”, 8-17, <http://www.stratfor.com/weekly/20110817-buffer-between-mexican-cartels-and-us-government#axzz3D37Ei7zA>

As we have discussed in our coverage of the drug war in Mexico, Mexican cartels, including the VCF, clearly possess the capability to construct and employ large vehicle-borne improvised explosive devices (VBIEDs) — truck bombs — and yet they have chosen not to. These groups are not averse to bloodshed, or even outright barbarity, when they believe it is useful. Their decision to abstain from certain activities, such as employing truck bombs or targeting a U.S. Consulate, indicates that there must be compelling strategic reasons for doing so. After all, groups in Lebanon, Pakistan and Iraq have demonstrated that truck bombs are a very effective means of killing perceived enemies and of sending strong messages. Perhaps the most compelling reason for the Mexican cartels to abstain from such activities is that they do not consider them to be in their best interest. One important part of their calculation is that such activities would remove the main buffer that is currently insulating them from the full force of the U.S. government: the Mexican government. The Buffer Despite their public manifestations of machismo, the cartel leaders clearly fear and respect the strength of the world's only superpower. This is evidenced by the distinct change in cartel activities along the U.S.-Mexico border, where a certain operational downshift routinely occurs. In Mexico, the cartels have the freedom to operate far more brazenly than they can in the United States, in terms of both drug trafficking and acts of violence. Shipments of narcotics traveling through Mexico tend to be far larger than shipments moving into and through the United States. When these large shipments reach the border they are taken to stash houses on the Mexican side, where they are typically divided into smaller quantities for transport into and through the United States. As for violence, while the cartels do kill people on the U.S. side of the border, their use of violence there tends to be far more discreet; it has certainly not yet incorporated the dramatic flair that is frequently seen on the Mexican side, where bodies are often dismembered or hung from pedestrian bridges over major thoroughfares. The cartels are also careful not to assassinate high-profile public figures such as police chiefs, mayors and reporters in the United States, as they frequently do in Mexico.

#### Drugs not key to cartels---they’ve diversified

Stephanie Leutert 16, Director of the Mexico Security Initiative at the University of Texas at Austin, “Fewer Drugs Doesn't Necessarily Mean Less Violence,” 10/20/16, https://www.lawfareblog.com/fewer-drugs-doesnt-necessarily-mean-less-violence

Mexico’s organized criminal groups are no longer mere drug traffickers, whose singular revenue streams would disappear if Americans kicked their drug habits. Instead, over the past decade, Mexico’s criminal groups have moved rapidly into a wide range of illicit activities, such as extortion, stealing oil, kidnapping, and taxing migrant smugglers. They’ve even gained a foothold in what used to be informal or even legal markets: pirated CDs, limes and avocados, and used cars, for example.

These are not just drug cartels any more. Most of them are diversified non-industrial criminal conglomerates of a sort. Think Samsung, only with guns and murder instead of heavy industry.

### 1NC – AT: Multilat

#### Multilat is outdated, bogged down, and too complex.

**Ferry 18** Jean Pisani-Ferry, Economics Professor with Sciences Po of Paris and the Hertie School of Governance of Berlin, former campaign director for Emmanuel Macron and Commissioner-General of France Stratégie, the Founding Director of the think tank Bruegel. [Should we give up on global governance? Policy Contribution 17, October 2018, https://bruegel.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/10/PC-17-2018.pdf (table 1 omitted)]//BPS

C. Obsolescence of global rules and institutions Although the previous argument primarily rests on the broad pattern of international trade and finance, the adverse effects of external liberalisation can be compounded by inadequate governance. As far as trade is concerned, two cases in point are, first, inertia in the categorisation of countries, especially the fact that emerging countries, including China, still enjoy developing country status in the WTO; and, second, failures to enforce the adequate protection of intellectual property (an issue on which the EU recently joined the US and filed a complaint at the WTO against Chinese practices; see European Union, 2018). These grievances, and others concerning subsidies or investment, are not new: they were clearly spelled out by policymakers from the Obama administration (see for example, Schwab, 2011, and Wu, 2016). The underlying concern is that the systemic convergence on a market economy template that was expected from participation in the WTO has failed to materialise. The rules and institutions of global trade have brought shallow convergence but not the deeper alignment of economic systems that was hoped for. More generally, existing rules and institutions were conceived for a different world. This is very apparent in the trade field: the GATT/WTO framework dates from what Baldwin (2016) has called the “first unbundling” of production and consumption. They were not designed for the “second unbundling” of knowledge and production that gave rise to the emergence of global value chains. For decades, the implicit assumption behind the structure of trade negotiations has been that nations have well-defined sectoral trade interests: they are either exporters or importers. But in a world of global value chains, they are both importers and exporters of similar products simultaneously. Even if the principles of multilateralism remain valid, important features of the rules and institutions in which they are embedded are increasingly outdated. In the same way, opening to capital movements was supposed to result in net financial flows from savings-rich to savings-poor countries. What has happened instead is a massive increase in gross flows resulting in the interpenetration of financial systems and the coexistence of sizeable external assets and liabilities. The consequence has been the emergence of a global financial cycle (see for example Rey, 2017) and of policy dilemmas that are quite different from those arising in a simple Mundell-Fleming framework, in which interdependence takes place through net inflows and outflows of capital. Developments in the climate field further illustrate the point. The 1997 Kyoto Protocol was negotiated under the assumption that the bulk of greenhouse gas emissions would continue to originate in the advanced countries. But by the time the Protocol was meant to enter into force, it was clear already that the hypothesis was deeply wrong. The exemption of developing countries from emissions reductions was one of the reasons why the US did not ratify the treaty. The failed Copenhagen agreement of 2009 was an attempt to replicate Kyoto on a global scale, but there was no consensus for such an approach. Rules can be reformed and institutions can adapt. But this is a long and demanding process, especially when it requires unanimity, when participating countries have diverging interests and when changes require ratification by parliaments where there is no majority to support them. Global rules therefore exhibit a strong inertia that often prevents necessary adaptations. Trade rules, amendments to which require unanimity, are a case in point. Institutions are nimbler and can adapt to changing priorities or perspectives on interdependence. The IMF for example has succeeded in adjusting to major changes in the international economic regime and major shifts in the intellectual consensus. But even institutions face limitations to their ability to keep up with underlying transformations. This is one of the reasons why solutions to emerging problems have often been looked for outside the existing multilateral, institution-based governance framework (Table 1). D. The imbalances of global governance A further reason for popular dissatisfaction with global governance is its unbalanced nature. The deeper international integration becomes, the broader the scope of policy its management should cover, and the more acute the tension between the technical requirements of global interdependence and the domestically-rooted legitimacy of public policies. This is most apparent in the field of taxation. International tax optimisation by multinationals has become an issue of significant relevance and it is estimated that 40 percent of their profit is being artificially shifted to low-tax countries – with major consequences for national budgets (Tørsløv et al, 2018). But the fact that taxation remains at the core of sovereign prerogatives limits the scope and ambition of initiatives conducted at international level. The result, which can be regarded as an illustration of Rodrik’s trilemma, is that global coordination in tax matters falls short of what equity-conscious citizens regard as desirable and, at the same time, exceeds what sovereignty-conscious citizens consider acceptable. The imbalances of global governance are by no means limited to the taxation field. The same can be found in a series of domains, for example biodiversity and the preservation of nature. E. Increased complexity The final obstacle to multilateral solutions has to do with the sheer complexity of the challenges global governance has to tackle. In recent decades channels of international interdependence have both multiplied and diversified. They now link together countries with significantly differing levels of technical, economic or financial development. Because they have developed outside the scope of negotiated rules and established institutions, some of channels of interdependence also escape the reach of international agreements to an unprecedented degree. This is especially, but not only, the case of the internet and the multiple networks that rely on it. The world does not fit anymore the usual representation whereby individual nations trade goods, capital and technology. Even putting aside geopolitical consequences and assuming a shared commitment to openness and multilateral solutions, such complexity is bound to test the limits of existing international governance arrangements.

# 2NC

## Topicality

### 2NC – AT: Predictability

#### ‘Antitrust law’ excludes sectors – that’s the realm of regulations.

Maggiolino ’15 [Mariateresa; October 30; Law Professor at the University of Bocconi; Competition Law as Regulation, “The regulatory breakthrough of competition law: definitions and worries,” Ch. 1, p. 13]

40 While antitrust law – and, in particular, the provisions about anticompetitive arrangements and monopolistic conduct – is thought to work as an ex post means, i.e. as a surgeon’s knife that eradicates the evil that is actually plaguing the market, economic regulation is meant to serve as an ex ante tool, i.e. to dictate in advance what prophylaxis the market should follow to avoid any pain that medicine says will or could occur. In particular, while the Chicagoan conception of competition law cannot but be backward-looking and fact-based, i.e. focused on what the involved firms did (or are doing) and on what specific market scenarios characterized (or still characterize) their acts, sector-specific, rate-and-entry regulations are also forward-looking and theory-laden, i.e. focused on what firms are expected to do, and on what events are expected to happen according to the economic theory called on to explain how markets function and develop.

## Advantage CP

### 2NC – Solves Rural Econ

#### The CP is way more important – the collapse of rural infrastructure causes rural flight

Kalu 14**.** Department of Urban and Regional Planning, Abia State Polytechnic. 2014. “Rural Infrastructure Development: A Tool for Resolving Urbanization Crisis. A Case Study of South-Eastern Nigeria.” World Environment, vol. 4, no. 1, pp. 14–21.

TITLE: “Rural Infrastructure Development: A Tool for Resolving Urbanization Crisis. A Case Study of South-Eastern Nigeria.”

1. Introduction Generally speaking, infrastructure is essential for the sustainability of human settlement. Today, it is no longer arguable that the imbalances in the provision of rural infrastructure when compared with that of the cities have negatively impacted cities’ sustainability. In fact, the rural-urban imbalance in development provides an explanation [and explain] for the unprecedented growth of urban centers and slums[1]. Therefore improving accessibility to basic services such as safe water, electricity, sanitation, and social infrastructural facilities for residents has been acknowledged as one of the principal ways of promoting sound human settlements, good health, and appropriate and decent living conditions[2], little wonder why many people today migrate to the cities as a result of the attractions of the infrastructure elements that are found there. Urban people are perceived to be ‘better-dressed, betterfed and better-exposed to modern civilization than rural people’. Many recognized the importance of the population characteristics in defining an urban place. They described an urban area as a place with high population density, composed of people from different ethnic groups[3]. Urban people are able to gain current information and have greater access to the government. Infrastructure in cities is seen as those basic facilities, structures and services that serve as a back bone for the development and economic wellbeing of cities. Migration is one of the most crucial phenomena which shape not only the structure of an area’s population but the spatial pattern and dynamics of areas settlement, likewise in rural settlement; it produces changes in both the sources and destination areas. The impact of migration on the spatial pattern and number of settlements is always in two forms of expansion or contraction of population. It then simply means that, if the destination areas absorb large influx of people, the settlement will expand in size and density of population. On the other hand, the source areas of the migrant will experience a decrease in population size and a decline in density. In rural-urban migration, a situation that seems to be on a continuous growth range, has resulted to the over population and urbanization of the cities and urban centers and this situation definitely brings about decay and dilapidation of the cities. With this, the development of the rural areas in turn now poses great challenges to economic and socio-cultural lives of the populace as well as the activities in rural areas. For many years, rural-urban migration was viewed favourably in economic development as a result of industrialization. Internal migration was thought to be a natural process in which surplus labour was gradually withdrawn from the rural sector to provide needed manpower for urban industrial growth process. However,[4] researched on Indian experience made it clear that rates of rural-urban migration greatly exceeded rates of urban job creation and swamped the absorptive capacity of both the formal sector industry and urban social services. Today, migration has become a major factor contributing to excess labour force in the urban centers, which has continued to increase the rate of unemployment and other social challenges caused by the imbalances between rural-urban environments. When an area gets more populated, its infrastructure bumps up against its carrying capacity. For instance, roads no longer satisfy the demands of a growing population, and then farmlands and forests are sacrificed to strip malls and housing developments.

### 2NC – Solves Cartels

#### Violence prevention spills over

Kleiman, '11 [Mark, Professor of Public Policy at the Luskin School of Public Affairs at the University of California, Los Angeles. He is Editor of the Journal of Drug Policy Analysis, the author of When Brute Force Fails, and a co-author, with Jonathan Caulkins and Angela Hawken, of Drugs and Drug Policy, Foreign Affairs, Oct, http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/68131/mark-kleiman/surgical-strikes-in-the-drug-wars]

Removing an organization would not reduce total smuggling capacity; someone would pick up the slack. But the leaders of the targeted trafficking group would, if the program were successful, find themselves out of business. The result might be the replacement of more violent trafficking activity by less violent trafficking activity. Less happily, it could lead to a temporary upsurge in violence due to the disruption of existing processes and relationships. But in either case, if the destruction of the first designated target was followed by an announcement that a new target-selection process was under way using the same scoring system, there would be great pressure for each of the remaining trafficking groups to reduce its violence level to escape becoming the next target.¶ The process could continue until none of the remaining groups was notably more violent than the rest. In effect, such a strategy would condition the traffickers' ability to remain in business on their willingness to conduct their affairs in a relatively nonviolent fashion. This does not mean any sort of explicit negotiation or "treaty" with Mexico's trafficking organizations. Trafficking, even nonviolently, would remain subject to enforcement. But highly violent trafficking would be the target of differential enforcement.¶ Of course, such an approach would face many challenges: agreeing on a set of metrics, collecting accurate data (especially if some organizations tried to carry out violent actions intended to implicate their rivals), keeping tabs on sourcing relationships, and maintaining sufficient publicity and transparency to avert accusations of corruption. But unlike the conventional approach of enforcement, prevention, and treatment, targeting violence at least has logic behind it. And unlike legalization, it would not cause a huge increase in drug abuse and has a political chance of being adopted. In the absence of another plausible way out of the current situation, it might be worth trying.

## Rural Development

### 2NC – Rural

#### Farming’s not key to rural communities---ag, forestry, fishing, AND mining combined employ ONLY 10% of the economy.

Laughlin ’16 [Lynda; December 8; Industry and Occupation Statistics Branch at the US Census; United States Census Bureau, “Beyond the Farm: Rural Industry Workers in America,” https://www.census.gov/newsroom/blogs/random-samplings/2016/12/beyond\_the\_farm\_rur.html]

Rural America faces unique challenges and opportunities compared with urban America. However, the contributions of rural communities go far beyond the farm. The rural economy has diversified substantially since the mid-20th Century. Jobs in the agricultural sector are on the decline while jobs in manufacturing, retail sales and educational services are on the rise.

Rural is often a catch phrase denoting everything that is not urban or metropolitan. This blog focuses specifically on the 704 counties in which 100.0 percent of the population lives in a rural area (referred to as “rural counties” in this analysis). For more information about how the U.S. Census Bureau defines urban and rural geographies, see Defining Rural at the U.S. Census Bureau.

The newly released Census Bureau data from the American Community Survey 5-year statistics show that rural counties vary widely among themselves and across regions as demonstrated by industry statistics.

Figure 1 shows the economy in rural counties is diverse and not necessarily dependent on farming or manufacturing. In fact, the largest segment of the civilian workforce in rural counties (22.3 percent) is employed in the education services, and health care and social assistance industry. This industry is mainly made up of schools, hospitals, home health care services and similar employers. It is in this industry where you find our elementary and middle school teachers and registered nurses. Another 10.9 percent of the workforce in rural counties is employed in the retail trade industry. A smaller share of the workforce is employed in the finance, wholesale trade and information industries combined.

Figure 1. Percent Employed by Type of Industry: Completely Rural Counties

While no longer the top industries in these areas, resource-based activities such as agriculture, forestry, fishing, hunting and mining still employ one out of 10 workers in rural counties. A somewhat higher share of rural employment in is in manufacturing. In fact, 12.1 percent of the rural civilian workforce is in this industry, performing duties as assemblers and fabricators, production workers and managers.

#### If not in a commercial farm, then probably employed elsewhere.

Good ’17 [Keith Good; January 21; the USDA’s National Agricultural Statistics Service, Purdue University (M.S.- Agricultural Economics), and Southern Illinois University School of Law; Farm Policy News, “The Importance of the Non-Farm Rural Economy to Farm Household Income,” https://farmpolicynews.illinois.edu/2017/01/importance-non-farm-rural-economy-farm-household-income/]

Dr. Peters noted that, “Despite accounting for only 24.3 percent of farms in Iowa, commercial farms operated most of the farmland acres (66.6 percent or about 1,000 acres per farm) and generated most of the agricultural sales (79.9 percent) in the state. These farms drive the production agriculture sector in Iowa. Intermediate farms are worked by owner-operator farmers, but have lower sales and smaller acreages. Representing 29.6 percent of all farms statewide, intermediate farms account for 11.8 percent of production value on small acreages (about 220 acres per farm). Residence farms are the most common in Iowa, accounting for 46.1 percent of all farms. However, farming is not the primary occupation of these operators; hence they produced only a small amount of sales (8.3 percent) and operated on very small acreages (about 118 acres per farm).”

There has been variability in net income performance among these three different categories of farms in recent years.

The study pointed out that net farm income has dropped the past three years for commercial farms. However, for intermediate farms in Iowa, “incomes have rebounded after several years of stagnation.” And residence farms have experienced only a minor decline in net farm income, “down 1.1 percent from 2012 levels.”

Percent change in net farm income by farm category (Income Trends for Iowa Farms and Farm Families 2003-2015, Iowa State University. December 2016).

Net Farm Income, A Part of Farm Household Income

With this general background on net farm income in mind, the Iowa State study also turned to the broader issue of farm household income, a variable that provides “a more accurate picture of the financial well-being of farm families.”

“To gain a fuller understanding of the financial condition of farm families, it is instructive to look at farm household/family incomes. Most farm management decisions are made with respect to the household, taking stock of farm and off-farm incomes earned by all members of the household,” the study said.

Dr. Peters explained that, “Residence farms had high household incomes ($115,941 in 2015) due to well-paid off-farm work. Since residence farms were operated by someone whose primary job is not farming, earnings off- the-farm ($102,614) accounted for 88.5 percent of the household’s income, with the small remainder coming from farm sources ($13,372).”

With respect to intermediate farm families, the study pointed out that, “Despite farming being the major occupation of the operator, off-farm earnings were the major source of income for intermediate farm families.

These farm households brought home $83,138 in income from all sources in 2015, yet 66.2 percent of that income was from off-farm activities.

### 2NC – AT: Polarization

#### Polarization never higher

**Walt 19**, Stephen, Robert and Renée Belfer professor of international relations at Harvard University, "America's Polarization Is a Foreign Policy Problem, Too," *Foreign Policy*, 3-11-2019, <https://foreignpolicy.com/2019/03/11/americas-polarization-is-a-foreign-policy-problem-too/>

That said, there’s no question that the United States is at a level of political polarization unseen for many decades. Most of the attention to this phenomenon has focused on its effects on America’s internal politics, and some observers are clearly worried that the core institutions of the country might be at risk—understandable, given President Donald Trump’s open hostility towards some of these institutions, his apparent fondness for authoritarians, and the emergence of something resembling “state media” (i.e., Fox News). Less attention has been paid, however, to the impact that hyperpolarization could have on U.S. foreign policy. Apart from an excellent essay by Ken Schultz of Stanford University, this topic just hasn’t received a lot of attention. But it should.

### 2NC – AT: Cartels – No Cartel Spillover

#### Statistics prove spillover thesis is a joke

**Del Bosque 8** [Melissa del Bosque is a reporter for The Texas Observer, where a version of this article originally appeared. She lives in Austin, Hyping the New Media Buzzword: ‘Spillover’ on the Border, https://nacla.org/article/hyping-new-media-buzzword-%E2%80%98spillover%E2%80%99-border]

By God, they’re coming to your neighborhood! Looking at another live feed from El Paso, listening to the breathless reports of violence and “expert” analysis about “spillover,” viewers could only assume that the city was under imminent assault.¶ The truth differs wildly from the perception. In 2008, according to the FBI, more than 1,600 people were killed by cartel violence in Juárez. El Paso, a city of 755,000, recorded just 18 murders in the same year. Laredo had 11; Brownsville and McAllen had three and nine, respectively. By comparison, Washington, D.C., with a population smaller than El Paso’s, had 186 homicides in 2008.¶Certainly, El Paso’s symbiotic relationship with Ciudad Juárez across the border has been disrupted by the explosion of drug violence south of the border, which began to escalate in January 2008. But it’s not the kind of disruption brought to you by CNN, Fox, The New York Times, and the rest of the media pack.

#### Diplomacy and cooperation prevent escalation

Jorge Heine 12, Chair in Global Governance at the Balsillie School of International Affairs, is Professor of Political Science at Wilfrid Laurier University, 10/26/12, “Regional Integration and Political Cooperation in Latin America,” http://lasa.international.pitt.edu/LARR/prot/fulltext/vol47no3/47-3\_209-217\_heine.pdf

Despite this fragmented picture of overlapping acronyms, schemes, and interests, there is little doubt that the forces of convergence have prevailed over those of divergence. The launch of the Latin American and Caribbean Community of Nations in 2010 is proof of this. Mexico, Chile, and Colombia are as much members of this body as are Venezuela, Bolivia, and Ecuador. Collective diplomacy, political cooperation, and a regional vision are very much the order of the day, transcending ideological differences. As may be seen in its reaction to the coup in Honduras in June 2009, a lack of understanding of this strong multilateral component in the foreign policies of Latin American nations lies at the root of the difficulties that the administration of US president Barack Obama has faced in the region, despite the enormous expectations raised there by his election.12 By imposing a unilateral solution that in effect condoned the coup, against the express wishes of the OAS and the overwhelming majority of Latin American governments, the United States squandered its infl uence in Latin America. Inter-American relations have gone downhill ever since, with the US ambassadors to Ecuador and to Mexico being forced to leave their posts in quick succession in 2011.

### 2NC – AT: Multilat

#### Gridlock is self-reinforcing.

Hale & Held 18 Dr Thomas Hale, Politics PhD from Princeton, Global Politics master’s degree from the London School of Economics, public policy professor at the University of Oxford, & David Held, a British political scientist, Politics and International Relations Professor at Durham University until his death. [Breaking the Cycle of Gridlock, Global Policy, 9(1), Wiley Online Library]

One of the central concepts developed in Gridlock was ‘self‐reinforcing interdependence’ (Hale et al., 2013), the mutually enabling relationship between globalization and the institutionalization of world politics that profoundly deepened interdependence over the postwar period. The idea is that international cooperation is not just a response states use to manage existing interdependence; over time, cooperation also increases the links between economic and social systems across borders, deepening interdependence further. For example, trade agreements create incentives for companies to develop global supply chains and invest in technologies that facilitate cross‐border production, changing their business models and building new constituencies for trade. The resulting increase in interdependence creates additional political incentives for countries to cooperate further, beginning the cycle again. We argued in Gridlock that this historical process of partially endogenous interdependence deepened to such a degree over the postwar period that a number of ‘second order’ cooperation problems arose – namely, multipolarity, harder problems, institutional inertia, and fragmentation – causing gridlock. Today it seems clear that gridlock itself also has a self‐reinforcing element, one that emerges from the corrosive effect of unmanaged globalization on domestic politics. The rise of nationalism and populism across the world, in many different kinds of countries, has multiple and complex origins. But this trend can be seen as part of a downward spiral in which gridlock leads to unmanaged globalization or unmet global challenges, which in turn help to provoke anti‐global backlashes that further undermine the operative capacity of global governance institutions (Figure 1). image Figure 1 Open in figure viewerPowerPoint The vicious cycle of self‐reinforcing gridlock. Consider each dynamic in turn. First, as per the gridlock argument, we face a multilateral system that is less and less able to manage global challenges, even as growing interdependence increases our need for such management. Second, in many areas this inability to manage globalization or to meet global challenges has led to real, and in many cases severe, harm to major sectors of the global population, often creating complex and disruptive knock‐on effects. Perhaps the most spectacular recent example of harm caused by mismanaged interdependence was the 2008–9 financial crisis. A product of inadequate regulation in major economies and at the global level, the crisis wrought havoc on the world economy in general, and on many countries in particular, which was reinforced in many places by severe austerity measures that tried to limit the fallout. We should not be surprised that such significant impacts have led to further destabilization. Third, what has become clear only several years after the crisis is not just the economic cost, but the scale of the political destruction to which the crisis contributed. Rising economic inequality, a long‐term trend in many economies, has been made more salient by the crisis. It reinforced a stark political cleavage between those who have benefited from the globalization, digitization, and automation of the economy, and those who feel left behind in the wake of these powerful disruptions. The global financial crisis was not the only cause of many of the political disruptions that have come to characterize and realign politics in major countries in the last few years, but it has been a critical contributing factor in several of them, building on the economic dislocations that globalization had effected over several decades (Colgan and Keohane, 2017). Perhaps most importantly, the financial crisis sharpened the divide between working‐class voters in industrialized countries, who were hit hard by the events, and other segments of the population. This division is particularly acute in spatial terms, in the cleavage between global cities and their hinterlands. Global cities like London, Paris, Shanghai, New York and San Francisco have become nodes of power and influence in the global economy, linked to each other through a variety of social and economic networks. Their citizens have benefited directly as opportunities have sharply risen. By contrast, those in the hinterlands, typically rural areas and deindustrialized cities, but not exclusively so, have often been left behind in absolute and relative terms, building up frustrations and resentments. The effect on politics has been profound, with a number of nationalist and populist movements emerging and, in some cases, winning elections (or otherwise seizing power) in many countries. Again, we should not be surprised that people exposed to the negative effects of globalization will turn against it. Research shows that over the course of history, right‐wing populist movements and financial crises are strongly correlated (see Funke et al., 2016). Relatedly, the 2008 crisis exacerbated many of the woes that have beset the eurozone since 2010, such as the repeated bailouts of Greece and other countries, and consumed European politics, driving voters on both the creditor and debtor side of the political chasm towards Euro‐scepticism. And more broadly, the impact on the centre‐left parties that have traditionally supported global and regional cooperation has also been severe, with the differential effects of globalization straining the traditional coalition between metropolitan progressives and the working class. Moreover, the financial crisis is only one area where gridlock has undercut the management of global challenges and undermined political support for global cooperation. Consider the global response to terrorism. International cooperation, though effective in many areas, has failed to prevent extremists from attacking civilians around the world. While relatively cohesive and centralized networks like Al Qaeda have been largely taken apart through a combination of aggressive policing, surveillance, drone attacks, and other techniques, more inchoate movements like the Islamic State are much harder to root out. The attacks by these groups, for example in Paris in 2015, have been all too effective in creating a public discourse in many countries that sees perpetual war between Islamists and the West. This sentiment, in turn, creates political pressure for militarized responses from the West that can create as many terrorists as they eliminate, as well as anti‐Muslim policies that breed further resentment. These negative effects also spill across issue areas. The failure to manage terrorism and to bring to an end the wars in the Middle East has had a particularly destructive impact on the global governance of migration. With millions of refugees fleeing their countries in search of safety and a better life for their families, many of them heading for Europe, the global forced migration regime has been overwhelmed. Many recipient countries have seen a potent political backlash from right‐wing national groups and disgruntled populations, which further reduces the ability of countries to generate effective solutions at the regional and global level. We see trends toward nationalism and populism across many different kinds of countries, from Trump's United States to Duterte's Philippines, from Putin's Russia to Brexit Britain, from Modi's India to Erdoğan's Turkey. The anti‐global backlash is heterogeneous and rife with contradictions. It encompasses terrorism in the name of Islam and Islamophobic discrimination against Muslims. It includes leftist rejection of trade agreements and right‐wing rejection of environmental agreements. One powerful tie that unites these disparate movements is a rejection of interdependence and collective efforts to govern it. Global institutions and (perceived) cosmopolitan elites have always been a potent and politically expedient whipping boy [scapegoat] for nationalist and populists, even when those institutions, or some other form of international cooperation, are needed to tame the socioeconomic forces that inflamed populist movements to begin with. This undermining of global cooperation, whether for migration, terrorism, financial regulation, climate change, or other areas, is the fourth and final element of self‐reinforcing gridlock. As the global trend to nationalism and populism undermines the effectiveness of global institutions even further, the whole cycle begins anew.

#### Competition wrecks it.

Egel 16 Naomi Egel, research associate in the International Institutions and Global Governance program, Government PhD candidate at Cornell University. [Multilateralism is Hard to Do, 6-9-2016, https://www.cfr.org/blog/multilateralism-hard-do]

Challenges to the liberal world order limit multilateralism Traditional multilateralism—as part of the U.S.-led liberal world order—is under strain and underperforming. At the precise moment that global interdependence is deepening, resurgent great power competition is undercutting prospects for sorely needed cooperation. Emerging powers are obviously determined to secure greater influence over international institutions. What is less clear is whether their ultimate aim is simply to increase their proportional weight and authority within these institutions, or something more ambitious—to replace the current norms and rules governing state conduct in spheres ranging from international security to development cooperation. The answer to this question matters. If countries like China, India, Russia, Brazil, and Turkey are invested in the system but merely looking for greater voice, the relative decline of the West seems less worrisome. If their aims are to transform the system, all bets are off. Complicating matters, the redistribution of global power is occurring in an increasingly crowded institutional environment—in which the effectiveness of different bodies varies dramatically. With many existing multilateral organizations deadlocked and resistant to reform, the United States and other countries are pursuing alternative, essentially experimental forms of international cooperation, including coalitions of the capable, interested, or likeminded. This dynamic is evidenced across the board, from the Nuclear Security Summit to the surprising resilience of the Group of Seven advanced market democracies. Multilateralism is also increasingly networked, disaggregated, and bottom-up. The Paris Agreement on climate change exemplifies this new model. Although it was an intergovernmental agreement, a slew of nonstate actors influenced its negotiation and will be critical to its implementation. It is also simply one part of the climate change puzzle, which is being addressed through multiple, mutually reinforcing multilateral initiatives. Finally, it took the form not of a single comprehensive treaty, handed down on all parties from above, but as the compilation of individual, nationally-determined contributions, in the hopes that the whole would exceed the sum of its parts. Domestic turbulence makes multilateral agreement more difficult Turbulent domestic politics around the world, including in the United States, create serious obstacles to effective multilateral cooperation. The tensions facing the European Union highlight this point: The persistence of low economic growth, the ongoing crisis in the Eurozone, Europe’s struggle to respond to uncontrolled flows of refugees and migrants, and the rise of nationalist and xenophobic parties have stopped integration in its tracks. Meanwhile, the total breakdown of social trust and governing structures in much of the Middle East poses a fundamental, potentially decades-long challenge for the region. Whatever agreements the United States and other external actors might be able to achieve in diplomatic corridors will not be sufficient to restore stability and deliver prosperity in the Middle East. Getting the world on the right track, in other words, increasingly depends on whether individual countries can get their own houses in order first. Take the international economy. In the wake of the global financial crisis, the major institutions of global economic governance performed rather well, staving off what might well have been a second Great Depression. What multilateral cooperation has not delivered, however, is a path to sustained global growth and prosperity. And the reason is that this outcome ultimately rests on sound domestic policy decisions and their implementation at the national level. The main challenges facing the global economy, including low productivity in developed economies and growing inequality around the world, will not be met through simply deeper commercial and financial integration or multilateral regulations.

# 1NR

## DA – Peak Farmland

### 1NR – Overview

#### Global war – every theater.

**Hendrix 16** [Cullen S. Hendrix, Associate Professor, University of Denver's Josef Korbel School of International Studies , “When Hunger Strikes: How Food Security Abroad Matters for National Security at Home By Cullen S. Hendrix,” April 2016, Chicago Council for Global Affairs, https://www.thechicagocouncil.org/sites/default/files/Report\_When\_Hunger\_Strikes\_1604.pdf]

Developing economies are increasingly integrated and dependent on global markets Over the past several decades, Africa and Asia have experienced a dramatic shift in their position in global markets. In the 1960s, African and Asian countries exported roughly as much food as they imported. By the 2010s, decades of population growth, mismanagement, and investment-curtailing policies made these regions much more dependent on imports. African countries ran food trade deficits of USD $30.1 billion; Asia’s food trade deficit ballooned to USD $96.6 billion, doubling between 2006 and 2011.21 The 20 most populous countries in Africa—a continent where close to two-thirds of the population currently works in the rural sector—are all net grain importers, with some countries, especially in arid North Africa, running massive grain deficits.22 The same story holds for Asia, where roughly 50 percent of the population is still in rural areas. While some of the most populous countries (Thailand, Vietnam) are large rice exporters, the region as a whole is import-dependent.

Though only about 20 percent of world food production is traded on international markets, prices for the remaining 80 percent—which circulates in local, regional, and national markets—increasingly follow world prices.23 This is particularly the case for coastal areas, markets benefiting from modern transportation networks, and import-dependent countries. Therefore, the strongest and quickest pass-throughs—international price changes that filter through to local consumers—are in Central America, the Middle East, North Africa, and the land-constrained Caribbean.24 Rural areas are not necessarily insulated from global food prices

Prices in more remote markets, such as those far from ports and major roadways, are less aligned with global prices and thus relatively more isolated from price spikes and volatility. For example, many African economies are less affected by global prices because households can switch to local staples like cassava and millet when prices for imported foods—like rice and wheat—climb.25

But while their relative isolation currently dampens the local effects of global price shocks, it also makes these countries more vulnerable when local harvests fail. For example, a recent US Famine Early Warning System Network (FEWS NET) report on South Sudan—a landlocked country marred by civil conflict and one of the world’s least-developed road networks—notes food prices and availability are highly varied across the country due to gaps in transportation infrastructure and seasonal rainfall shortages.26

Furthermore, given rapid urbanization, problems with market access, large post-harvest losses, and stubborn yield gaps (see Box 1, “Important terms”) in the region, researchers expect these African countries to become increasingly import-dependent. Large investments in rural infrastructure such as farm-tomarket roads are needed to address rural poverty, a major cause of food insecurity; lessen the acute impacts of local crop failures, be they caused by drought, disease, or political instability; and enhance the resilience of rural livelihoods.

When, where, and why food prices lead to political instability

Research shows that food prices have different effects on political instability that roughly break down along the urban-rural divide. In urban areas, high food prices often lead to political instability, though national wealth, political institutions, and policy choices mediate this relationship. In rural areas, low food prices lead to political instability, though in general rural unrest is less likely to be an existential threat to incumbent governments. This section explores these relationships in detail.

The relationship between food insecurity and political stability is seemingly rather straightforward. Roughly two-thirds of the world’s chronically food insecure live in seven countries: Bangladesh, China, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Ethiopia, India, Indonesia, and Pakistan, of which all but China have significant histories of civil strife. This observed relationship is due in part to the fact that both chronic food insecurity and civil conflict are symptoms of poverty and because conflict itself is a significant cause of food insecurity and higher food prices.

#### Deforestation causes extinction

Tuthill, 13—AccuWeather, citing Meg Symington, director at the World Wildlife Fund (Samantha-Rae, “Deforestation of Amazon Could Alter Global Weather”, <http://www.accuweather.com/en/weather-news/amazon-climate-change/20184965>, dml)

Over the course of the past 40 years, almost 20 percent of the Amazon rainforest has been lost due to deforestation. Some experts worry that the rapid depletion of this vast ecosystem could eliminate what remains in the next 40 years. While the safety and longevity of the Amazon is important for its own sake, weather patterns and the climate can also be affected on a global scale by the increased loss of this area.

"The issue is that the Amazon is so big that it affects weather at the continental and even the global scale," Meg Symington, Amazon director at the World Wildlife Fund-U.S. (WWF), said.

According to Symington, researchers have been looking for teleconnections, the impacts such a massive forest can have beyond on just its immediate environment. The World Bank released a report in 2011, Assessment of the Risk of Amazon Dieback, which discusses how changes in the Amazon could transform it from a carbon sink to a carbon source. The density of the trees in the rainforest absorb a great deal of carbon dioxide, 0.8 to 1.1 billion metric tons of it. As the ecosystem changes, however, it could begin to release more of the greenhouse gas than it takes in, which could affect global temperatures.

Because of the size and location of the Amazon, as well as the amount of rain that it produces, the effects it has on weather patterns reach well beyond its immediate area.

"Studies have shown that rainfall in southern South America is actually impacted by the Amazon and could decrease significantly if you have additional deforestation," Symington said. "Maybe even the American Midwest, parts of North America, in terms of the weather pattern, could be affected."

Symington said that trade winds bring 50 percent of all the rain that falls in the Amazon from evapotranspiration, which is a crucial part of the water cycle that includes water evaporated from plants; as precipitation falls in the rainforest into the lush vegetation, the evaporation of that rain from the plants creates more rain to fall. Fifteen percent of the atmosphere's water vapor comes from this process.

"All of this has to do with a tipping point," Symington said. "With deforestation, if you go beyond a certain point in the Amazon there's an issue of where the whole system becomes destabilized and you would switch from a tropical, moist forest system, to something that was much drier and more like the Cerrado of central Brazil, sort of a dry forest, savanna system. If that happened it would have a huge impact on species in the Amazon and also on the climate."

About 20 percent of the fresh river water in the world comes from the Amazon River, and drying of the forest can negatively influence that water source. Symington told Accuweather.com that changes to this freshwater output would affect the entire current off the coast of South America, which could affect the jet stream, which would ripple into a change in weather patterns across the globe.

There is also an immediate issue of how the balance of the rain forest affects its own ecosystem.

"The Amazon is home to at least 10 percent of the world's species, probably more, because there are a lot of species that have not been discovered yet that live in the Amazon," Symington said.

"The most fish species in the world are found in the Amazon. Too much deforestation and you lose not only the terrestrial species, but you would completely change the hydrological system in the Amazon with flooding. The river comes up meters in the rainy season and that would all change if you had this forest dieback as well."

Without the trees to absorb the river's flooding, the soil and landscape around the river would be drastically altered. In Brazil, where a large percentage of their electric energy comes from hydropower, a change to the flow of the river would affect the amount of gigawatts that the hydropower dam produces. Moderate, careful and controlled use of the Amazon also supports local food sources, livelihoods and pollinating animals and insects that agriculture depends on. Some scientists and researchers seek out genetic resources that could be used for global medicinal purposes.

Too much unnecessary change to an ecosystem can create a chain reaction on its species and on the general environment, and we may not fully know the extent of where this chain reaction may go.

"We always talk about conservation in terms of 'don't throw away the rivets,'" Syminton said. "If you pull rivet by rivet out and throw them away, the whole system falls apart, so we need to be careful. People may think, 'What's one species?' but then you never know what happens when the whole system falls apart."

The World Bank's assessment supports the same idea, stating, "Changing forest structure and behavior would have significant implications for the local, regional and global carbon and water cycles. Amazon forest dieback would be a massive event, affecting all life-forms that rely on this diverse ecosystem, including humans, and producing ramifications for the entire planet."

#### Zoonotic disease causes extinction

Quammen 2012 - award-winning science writer, long-time columnist for *Outside* magazine for fifteen years, with work in National Geographic, Harper's, Rolling Stone, the New York Times Book Review and other periodicals  
David, “Could the next big animal-to-human disease wipe us out?,” Sep 29, The Guardian, pg. 29, Lexis

Infectious disease is all around us. It's one of the basic processes that ecologists study, along with predation and competition. Predators are big beasts that eat their prey from outside. Pathogens (disease-causing agents, such as viruses) are small beasts that eat their prey from within. Although infectious disease can seem grisly and dreadful, under ordinary conditions, it's every bit as natural as what lions do to wildebeests and zebras. **But** conditions aren't always ordinary. Just as predators have their accustomed prey, so do pathogens. And just as a lion might occasionally depart from its normal behaviour - to kill a cow instead of a wildebeest, or a human instead of a zebra - so a pathogen can shift to a new target. **Aberrations occur**. When a pathogen leaps from an animal into a person, and succeeds in establishing itself as an infectious presence, sometimes causing illness or death, the result is a zoonosis. It's a mildly technical term, zoonosis, unfamiliar to most people, but it helps clarify the biological complexities behind the ominous headlines about swine flu, bird flu, Sars, emerging diseases in general, and the threat of a global pandemic. It's a word of the future, destined for heavy use in the 21st century. Ebola and Marburg are zoonoses. So is bubonic plague. So was the so-called Spanish influenza of 1918-1919, which had its source in a wild aquatic bird and emerged to kill as many as 50 million people. All of the human influenzas are zoonoses. As are monkeypox, bovine tuberculosis, Lyme disease, West Nile fever, rabies and a strange new affliction called Nipah encephalitis, which has killed pigs and pig farmers in Malaysia. Each of these zoonoses reflects the action of a pathogen that can "spillover", crossing into people from other animals. Aids is a disease of zoonotic origin caused by a virus that, having reached humans through a few accidental events in western and central Africa, now passes human-to-human. This form of interspecies leap is not rare; about 60% of all human infectious diseases currently known either cross routinely or have recently crossed between other animals and us. Some of those - notably rabies - are familiar, widespread and still horrendously lethal, killing humans by the thousands despite centuries of efforts at coping with their effects. Others are new and inexplicably sporadic, claiming a few victims or a few hundred, and then disappearing for years. **Zoonotic pathogens can hide**. The least conspicuous strategy is to lurk within what's called a reservoir host: a living organism that carries the pathogen while suffering little or no illness. When a disease seems to disappear between outbreaks, it's often still lingering nearby, within some reservoir host. A rodent? A bird? A butterfly? A bat? To reside undetected is probably easiest wherever biological diversity is high and the ecosystem is relatively undisturbed. The converse is also true: ecological disturbance causes diseases to emerge. Shake a tree and things fall out. Michelle Barnes is an energetic, late 40s-ish woman, an avid rock climber and cyclist. Her auburn hair, she told me cheerily, came from a bottle. It approximates the original colour, but the original is gone. In 2008, her hair started falling out; the rest went grey "pretty much overnight". This was among the lesser effects of a mystery illness that had nearly killed her during January that year, just after she'd returned from Uganda. Her story paralleled the one Jaap Taal had told me about Astrid, with several key differences - the main one being that Michelle Barnes was still alive. Michelle and her husband, Rick Taylor, had wanted to see mountain gorillas, too. Their guide had taken them through Maramagambo Forest and into Python Cave. They, too, had to clamber across those slippery boulders. As a rock climber, Barnes said, she tends to be very conscious of where she places her hands. No, she didn't touch any guano. No, she was not bumped by a bat. By late afternoon they were back, watching the sunset. It was Christmas evening 2007. They arrived home on New Year's Day. On 4 January, Barnes woke up feeling as if someone had driven a needle into her skull. She was achy all over, feverish. "And then, as the day went on, I started developing a rash across my stomach." The rash spread. "Over the next 48 hours, I just went down really fast." By the time Barnes turned up at a hospital in suburban Denver, she was dehydrated; her white blood count was imperceptible; her kidneys and liver had begun shutting down. An infectious disease specialist, Dr Norman K Fujita, arranged for her to be tested for a range of infections that might be contracted in Africa. All came back negative, including the test for Marburg. Gradually her body regained strength and her organs began to recover. After 12 days, she left hospital, still weak and anaemic, still undiagnosed. In March she saw Fujita on a follow-up visit and he had her serum tested again for Marburg. Again, negative. Three more months passed, and Barnes, now grey-haired, lacking her old energy, suffering abdominal pain, unable to focus, got an email from a journalist she and Taylor had met on the Uganda trip, who had just seen a news article. In the Netherlands, a woman had died of Marburg after a Ugandan holiday during which she had visited a cave full of bats. Barnes spent the next 24 hours Googling every article on the case she could find. Early the following Monday morning, she was back at Dr Fujita's door. He agreed to test her a third time for Marburg. This time a lab technician crosschecked the third sample, and then the first sample. The new results went to Fujita, who called Barnes: "You're now an honorary infectious disease doctor. You've self-diagnosed, and the Marburg test came back positive." The Marburg virus had reappeared in Uganda in 2007. It was a small outbreak, affecting four miners, one of whom died, working at a site called Kitaka Cave. But Joosten's death, and Barnes's diagnosis, implied a change in the potential scope of the situation. That local Ugandans were dying of Marburg was a severe concern - sufficient to bring a response team of scientists in haste. But if tourists, too, were involved, tripping in and out of some python-infested Marburg repository, unprotected, and then boarding their return flights to other continents, the place was not just a peril for Ugandan miners and their families. It was also an international threat. The first team of scientists had collected about 800 bats from Kitaka Cave for dissecting and sampling, and marked and released more than 1,000, using beaded collars coded with a number. That team, including scientist Brian Amman, had found live Marburg virus in five bats. Entering Python Cave after Joosten's death, another team of scientists, again including Amman, came across one of the beaded collars they had placed on captured bats three months earlier and 30 miles away. "It confirmed my suspicions that these bats are moving," Amman said - and moving not only through the forest but from one roosting site to another. Travel of individual bats between far-flung roosts implied circumstances whereby Marburg virus might ultimately be transmitted all across Africa, from one bat encampment to another. It voided the comforting assumption that this virus is strictly localised. And it highlighted the complementary question: why don't outbreaks of Marburg virus disease happen more often? Marburg is only one instance to which that question applies. Why not more Ebola? Why not more Sars? In the case of Sars, the scenario could have been very much worse. Apart from the 2003 outbreak and the aftershock cases in early 2004, it hasn't recurred. . . so far. Eight thousand cases are relatively few for such an explosive infection; 774 people died, not 7 million. Several factors contributed to limiting the scope and impact of the outbreak, of which humanity's good luck was only one. Another was the speed and excellence of the laboratory diagnostics - finding the virus and identifying it. Still another was the brisk efficiency with which cases were isolated, contacts were traced and quarantine measures were instituted, first in southern China, then in Hong Kong, Singapore, Hanoi and Toronto. If the virus had arrived in a different sort of big city - more loosely governed, full of poor people, lacking first-rate medical institutions - **it might have burned through a much larger segment of humanity**. One further factor, possibly the most crucial, was inherent in the way Sars affects the human body: symptoms tend to appear in a person before, rather than after, that person becomes highly infectious. That allowed many Sars cases to be recognised, hospitalised and placed in isolation before they hit their peak of infectivity. With influenza and many other diseases, the order is reversed. That probably helped account for the scale of worldwide misery and death during the 1918-1919 influenza. And that infamous global pandemic occurred in the era before globalisation. Everything nowadays moves around the planet faster, including viruses. **When the Next Big One comes**, **it will** likely **conform to the** same perverse pattern as the **1918 influenza**: high infectivity preceding notable symptoms. That will help it move through cities and airports like an angel of death. The Next Big One is a subject that disease scientists around the world often address. The most recent big one is Aids, of which the eventual total bigness cannot even be predicted - about 30 million deaths, 34 million living people infected, and with no end in sight. Fortunately, not every virus goes **airborne** from one host to another. If HIV-1 could, you and I might already be dead. If the **rabies** virus could, it **would be the most horrific pathogen on the planet**. The influenzas are well adapted for airborne transmission, which is why a new strain can circle the world within days. The Sars virus travels this route, too, or anyway by the respiratory droplets of sneezes and coughs - hanging in the air of a hotel corridor, moving through the cabin of an aeroplane - and that capacity, combined with its case fatality rate of almost 10%, is what made it so scary in 2003 to the people who understood it best. Human-to-human transmission is the crux. That capacity is what separates a bizarre, awful, localised, intermittent and mysterious disease (such as Ebola) from a global pandemic. Have you noticed the persistent, low-level buzz about avian influenza, the strain known as H5N1, among disease experts over the past 15 years? That's because avian flu worries them deeply, though it hasn't caused many human fatalities. Swine flu comes and goes periodically in the human population (as it came and went during 2009), sometimes causing a bad pandemic and sometimes (as in 2009) not so bad as expected; but avian flu resides in a different category of menacing possibility. It worries the flu scientists because they know that H5N1 influenza is extremely virulent in people, with a high lethality. As yet, there have been a relatively low number of cases, and it is poorly transmissible, so far, from human to human. It'll kill you if you catch it, very likely, but you're unlikely to catch it except by butchering an infected chicken. But if H5N1 mutates or reassembles itself in just the right way, if it adapts for human-to-human transmission, it could become the biggest and fastest killer disease since 1918. It got to Egypt in 2006 and has been especially problematic for that country. As of August 2011, there were 151 confirmed cases, of which 52 were fatal. That represents more than a quarter of all the world's known human cases of bird flu since H5N1 emerged in 1997. But here's a critical fact: those unfortunate Egyptian patients all seem to have acquired the virus directly from birds. This indicates that the virus hasn't yet found an efficient way to pass from one person to another. Two aspects of the situation are dangerous, according to biologist Robert Webster. The first is that Egypt, given its recent political upheavals, may be unable to staunch an outbreak of transmissible avian flu, if one occurs. His second concern is shared by influenza researchers and public health officials around the globe: with all that mutating, with all that contact between people and their infected birds, the virus could hit upon a genetic configuration making it highly transmissible among people. "As long as H5N1 is out there in the world," Webster told me, "**there is the possibility of disaster**. . . There is the theoretical possibility that it can acquire the ability to transmit human-to-human." He paused. "And then God help us." We're unique in the history of mammals. No other primate has ever weighed upon the planet to anything like the degree we do. In ecological terms, we are almost paradoxical: large-bodied and long-lived but grotesquely abundant. **We are an outbreak**. **And here's the thing about outbreaks**: **they end**. In some cases they end after many years, in others they end rather soon. In some cases they end gradually, in others they end with a crash. In certain cases, they end and recur and end again. Populations of tent caterpillars, for example, seem to rise steeply and fall sharply on a cycle of anywhere from five to 11 years. The crash endings are dramatic, and for a long while they seemed mysterious. What could account for such sudden and recurrent collapses? One possible factor is infectious disease, and viruses in particular.

#### Nuclear war doesn’t cause extinction

McDonald 19, writer and geography PhD student at University of Oxford studying the intersection of grassroots movements and energy transition. (Samuel Miller, 1-4-2019, “Deathly Salvation”, *The Trouble*, https://www.the-trouble.com/content/2019/1/4/deathly-salvation)

A devastating fact of climate collapse is that there may be a silver lining to the mushroom cloud. First, it should be noted that a nuclear exchange does not inevitably result in apocalyptic loss of life. Nuclear winter—the idea that firestorms would make the earth uninhabitable—is based on shaky science. There’s no reliable model that can determine how many megatons would decimate agriculture or make humans extinct. Nations have already detonated 2,476 nuclear devices. An exchange that shuts down the global economy but stops short of human extinction may be the only blade realistically likely to cut the carbon knot we’re trapped within. It would decimate existing infrastructures, providing an opportunity to build new energy infrastructure and intervene in the current investments and subsidies keeping fossil fuels alive. In the near term, emissions would almost certainly rise as militaries are some of the world’s largest emitters. Given what we know of human history, though, conflict may be the only way to build the mass social cohesion necessary for undertaking the kind of huge, collective action needed for global sequestration and energy transition. Like the 20th century’s world wars, a nuclear exchange could serve as an economic leveler. It could provide justification for nationalizing energy industries with the interest of shuttering fossil fuel plants and transitioning to renewables and, uh, nuclear energy. It could shock us into reimagining a less ~~suicidal~~ civilization, one that dethrones the death-cult zealots who are currently in power. And it may toss particulates into the atmosphere sufficient to block out some of the solar heat helping to drive global warming. Or it may have the opposite effects. Who knows? What we do know is that humans can survive and recover from war, probably even a nuclear one. Humans cannot recover from runaway climate change. Nuclear war is not an inevitable extinction event; six degrees of warming is.

### 1NR – Link

#### Yes Link.

#### 1 – Agriculture Consolidation. It’s necessary to further innovation and feed the world – the AFFs coops prevenr that.

Lang '16 - president of The Prairie Strategy Group, former president of the Iowa Farm Bureau Federation   
[Craig, Aug 29, "Consolidation, innovation in agriculture requires strong leadership," https://www.desmoinesregister.com/story/opinion/columnists/iowa-view/2016/08/29/consolidation-innovation-agriculture-requires-strong-leadership/89544952/]

With the world population expected to grow by an estimated 2.5 billion people by 2050, new thinking will be required to better manage cyclical challenges such as fluctuating commodity prices, insects and weeds to not only sustain current levels, but to advance growth potential. This is where the intersection between traditional farming techniques and new technologies must find a balance. The new catch phrase in farming is precision agriculture.

Today, biotechnology is applied to nearly all corn, soybeans, and cotton grown in the U.S., advanced genetics are applied to livestock helping farmers to combat environmental threats and allowing for food to be grown, in more challenging conditions. Farmers are also running more efficient farms thanks to automated machinery, global positioning, finely tuned livestock and poultry rations, crop protection, and more sophisticated data collection.

While these types of advancements are providing lasting benefits within the agricultural community, concern about consolidation within the crop science industry is leading to questions about how innovation may affect the farmer’s bottom line.

When two companies offering similar products and services take steps to eliminate duplication and strengthen market share, concern over how such consolidation would impact farming communities seems justified. This concern sometimes overshadows the positive impacts of such actions, however, and it’s important that they be considered. In reality, collaboration between innovators and scientists is necessary if we want to see the kind of major advancements needed to fill the demand of a growing population.

Often farmers in the ag industry, which offer different but complimentary products, explore the opportunity to combine their expertise and apply greater resources to develop the next generation of technologies and services. We have seen these types of collaborations in all sectors of the agriculture industry. For instance, California dairy producers were the leaders in the dairy field when I was in college. Their expertise in balancing rations and using new technology in producing more milk per cow was copied by dairymen across the country.

The advancements in agriculture since I was a young boy on the farm are mind-boggling. Other examples are equipment manufacturers both in Iowa and beyond who have partnered with producers and patent holders to acquire technology that complements their existing products. Bauer Built Manufacturing in Paton is an example of a farmer shop that built and patented tool bars for large row crop planters when farmers asked for larger row units to plant corn and soybeans. And the equipment industry had missed the trend. John Deere eventually partnered with Bauer Built Manufacturing to build their large row crop planters. These partnerships allow them to more effectively meet the needs of the farming community.

Partnerships like these protect the farmers because the companies are not eliminating a product or service, but actually improving two separate offerings. This allows companies to bolster research and development of new, more effective products and streamline the decision-making and buying process for farmers.

As we read about further merger and acquisition within the crop and livestock industry, it becomes extremely important that the farmer and farm community weigh in on the trends of the future. If the consolidation is good, both the farmers and the consumers benefit. Hopefully they will benefit and realize opportunity by new thinking that would not only help decrease operational costs for farmers, but would also encourage stronger investment in the research and development of more effective products to meet ever evolving agricultural needs.

The future of Iowa farming will depend on our ability to learn from the past while embracing new options for advancement. The potential for growth will be realized through hard work and the development of integrated and efficient technologies that solve the problems farmers face season after season, while providing real cost savings throughout the entire system.

#### 2 – Small farms. They’re less productive than consolidated ag.

Nordhaus '21 - founder and executive director of the Breakthrough Institute  
[Ted and Dan Blaustein-Rejto; Apr 18; "Big Agriculture Is Best;" https://foreignpolicy.com/2021/04/18/big-agriculture-is-best/]

Many sustainable agriculture advocates tout the recent growth of organic agriculture as proof that an alternative food system is possible. But growing market share vastly overstates how much food is actually produced organically. In reality, organic production accounts for little more than 1 percent of total U.S. agricultural land use. Meanwhile, only a bit more than 5 percent of food sales come from organic producers, mostly because organic sales are overwhelmingly concentrated in high-value sectors of the market, namely produce and dairy, and fetch a premium from well-heeled consumers.

Moreover, organic farms, large and small, don’t actually outperform large conventional farms by many important environmental measures. Scale, technology, and productivity make good environmental sense and economic sense. Because organic farming requires more land for every calorie or pound produced, a large-scale shift to organic farming would entail converting more forest and other land to farming, resulting in greater habitat loss and more greenhouse gas emissions. And while organic farming doesn’t use synthetic pesticides or fertilizers, it often results in greater nitrogen pollution because manure is a highly inefficient way to deliver nutrients to crops.

Another benefit of large-scale U.S. farms is that because they are so efficient, economically and environmentally, they are also able to produce vastly more food than Americans can consume, making the country the world’s largest agricultural exporter as well.

That benefits the U.S. economy, of course, but it also comes with an environmental benefit for the world. In the contemporary environmental imagination, highly productive, globally traded agriculture is a bad thing—poisoning the land at home and undermining food sovereignty abroad. But in reality, a pound of grain or beef exported from the United States almost always displaces a pound that would have been produced with more land and greenhouse gas emissions somewhere else.

#### 3 – Organic Agriculture. 2AC spotted the link – it’s worse for the environment and guarantees peak cropland.

Blaustein-Rejto '17 - Director of the Food and Agriculture program at Breakthrough   
[Dan; Nov 30; "The Problems with a Large-Scale Shift to Organic Farming;” https://thebreakthrough.org/issues/food/the-problems-with-a-large-scale-shift-to-organic-farming]

Converting all food production to organic, according to the study, would increase the amount of land needed for agriculture by 33%, and deforestation up to 15%, but would reduce greenhouse gas emissions up to 7% compared to a scenario following current agricultural trends. This is an unacceptable environmental tradeoff and so the authors note that scaling up organic would only be desirable and feasible if food waste and meat production were cut. Cutting food waste by 50%, for instance, would also cut the amount of extra land needed.

These reductions may or may not be realistic. Meat demand is increasing as global population and incomes grow. Although many studies highlight the environmental benefits of reducing meat consumption, there is no clear path to doing so. And although cutting food waste is possible, a certain level of waste is inevitable. Regardless, these system changes do not depend on converting more land to organic. In fact, if cuts in meat and waste are possible, they would be even more beneficial when combined with conventional rather than organic farming.

Environmental consequences

The study finds that scaling up organic farming would cut nitrogen pollution, greenhouse gas emissions, and pesticide use, but a careful and critical reading shows otherwise. To come to these conclusions, the authors make three questionable assumptions: that organic farming could maintain high crop yields even when crops do not receive enough nitrogen, that organic farming could use nitrogen at least twice as efficiently as conventional farming, and that organic farms do not apply pesticides.

Organic farming prohibits the use of synthetic fertilizers, the primary source of nitrogen for crops worldwide.1 With less of this essential nutrient available, organic production tends to produce less food per plot of land – about 20-25% less on average, according to recent estimates.2,3 It therefore requires more land to grow the same amount of food as non-organic methods.4 The study incorporates this gap in yields into its estimates, but misses the mark when considering other ways that yields may be lower.

Assumption 1: Constant yields under insufficient nitrogen

The study’s estimates of additional land use from organic farming are likely underestimates, as other researchers such as weed scientist Chris Preston have noted. In modeling a scaling up of organic farming, the authors assume that farmers plant a legume crop every five years (using 20% of their land). They note that this might not provide enough nitrogen for crops to grow if more than 60% of the agriculture converted to organic. This suggests that organic farming at this scale would have an even higher yield gap and may not be able to meet global food demand. To grow enough food organically, even more land would need to be used to grow legumes and fix nitrogen. Before the advent of synthetic fertilizer, for instance, farmers would typically set aside 25-50% of their land to fix nitrogen5 – more than the 20% assumed in the study – and yields were still far lower than they are today. However, the study did not account for this, simply noting instead that organic agriculture would have “critically low N[itrogen] levels” and may require more nitrogen.

Additionally, the study overestimates the amount of nitrogen available to crops from legumes. The authors estimate that planting a legume crop every five years would provide enough nitrogen. However, they mistakenly assume that all of the nitrogen in crop residues (the part of the plant remaining after harvest) is taken up by subsequent crops.6 A wide variety of other types of studies find that only a fraction of this nitrogen is actually taken up – usually less than 30%.7 With at least 70% less nitrogen available, land use would need to be even larger to provide enough nitrogen and yields to meet food demand.

This additional need for land would require converting new land, such as tropical forests and grasslands, to cropland, resulting in significantly more deforestation, habitat loss, and greenhouse gas emissions than the researchers project. This would be a major setback not only for global conservation efforts, but also for climate mitigation.8 The study’s finding that converting to organic farming could reduce greenhouse gas emissions depends both on how much nitrogen fertilizer is used as well as on how much forests, which are rich carbon sinks, are converted to farmland. Therefore, the additional land use would likely mean that scaling up organic agriculture, particularly to 80 or 100%, would result in more emissions than conventional, not less.

Assumption 2: Improved nitrogen efficiency for organic, but not conventional

The study’s authors also grossly underestimate the difference in nitrogen use and pollution under conventional and organic farming. In comparing the two, they assume that organic farming could maintain production while using nitrogen 60-80% more efficiently, citing a paper by Nathan Mueller and colleagues. This is an unrealistic assumption – Mueller told me he would never use the results from the paper they cited to support their claims. Other studies have found that per unit of food production, organic farming often results in more nitrogen-related pollution due to the use of manure.9

More importantly, the authors don’t make the same assumption about improved efficiency for conventional farming, such that what they present as a comparison between organic and conventional is in fact far from apples to apples. If they did and farmers around the world were able to maintain yields while using nitrogen more efficiently, they could use far less synthetic fertilizer. Such a situation appears to be technically feasible; farmers in China and the American Midwest, for example, could use less fertilizer, while farmers in less productive regions could increase production by using more fertilizer.10 This decreased fertilizer use would generate substantially less greenhouse gas emissions (as well as nitrogen pollution) than the authors estimate in their study. Taking both this and the additional land use into account strongly suggests that meeting future food demand with organic farming would contribute more to climate change than conventional farming, not less.11

Assumption 3: Zero pesticide use under organic

The study also assumes that scaling up organic farming would eliminate pesticide use. This is a common misconception that many consumers hold. Organic farming prohibits the use of synthetic pesticides (with a few exceptions) but allows the use of various naturally derived pesticides. Some of these, such as copper sulfate, pose large ecological and human health risks.12 There is no simple or widely agreed-upon way to compare the environmental performance of these organic pesticides with conventional ones.13 However, it's clear that organic pesticides can be environmentally harmful, sometimes as much or more so than synthetic ones.14 For instance, pesticide use on a sample of organic vineyards in northern Spain was found to have a larger environmental impact than that on similar conventional vineyards.15

### 1NR – AT: Organics Efficient

#### 2 – Smaller farms in more developed countries structurally decimate yields --- and they preclude rewilding landscapes which solves biodiversity and sequestration arguments better

**Nordhaus et al. 15** [Ted Nordhaus, economist and Sterling Professor of Economics at Yale University, Michael Shellenberger and Linus Blomqvist, “George Monbiot is wrong to suggest small farms are best for humans and nature,” The Guardian, September 25, 2015, <https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2015/sep/25/george-monbiot-is-wrong-to-suggest-small-farms-are-best-for-humans-and-nature>]

However, in his column yesterday, he rejects ecomodernism by making a sweeping claim. There is, he writes, “an inverse relationship between the size of farms and the crops they produce. The smaller they are, on average, the greater the yield per hectare.” The implication is that agricultural modernisation is neither land-sparing nor beneficial to the poor.

Nothing could be further from the truth. There are, it is true, many studies showing an inverse relationship between yields and farm size in developing regions. But the relevant comparison is not between small farms and slightly larger ones in poor countries. It is between smallholder farms in developing nations and farms of any size in developed nations (which are almost always larger than farms in poor countries).

One widely cited study found that the smallest African farms produced about 25% more yield per hectare than the largest African farms. But the average American farm produced about 10 times more yield per hectare than either. Yield gaps between farmers in rich nations and those in poor countries are profound. US farmers harvest five times more per hectare than African farmers in maize and more than three times in rice. To suggest that smallholder farmers, particularly those in subsistence rain-fed agriculture, are more productive per unit of land than large-scale modern farmers is simply wrong.

Monbiot acknowledges that the reason that small farms in poor countries have higher yields than larger ones is because they have higher labor inputs, but fails to consider the implications of this fact. In poor nations, the lack of access to alternative livelihoods for large rural populations is the reason that labor is cheap and relatively high yields can be achieved on very small farms. Awash in cheap labor and lacking access to capital, markets, and infrastructure, farmers raise yields by applying more labor.

But any nature and land-sparing vision predicated on this model of agriculture would require maintaining large rural populations throughout the developing world in a state a of deep agrarian poverty, with no alternative livelihoods to speak of. Could you, in theory, raise yields dramatically through high inputs of labor (albeit also with healthy inputs of synthetic fertiliser, irrigation, and pesticides as well)? Perhaps. But doing so would only be possible given a very large pool of cheap or free (eg family) labor.

This seems to us to be neither a particularly plausible way to reduce human impacts on the environment nor an acceptable future for the billion people today living on less than a dollar a day. To suggest, as Monbiot does, that poor farmers are better off remaining on the farm is to suggest that they are better off remaining poor.

Without question, the journey from subsistence economies to modern livelihoods is not an easy one and moving from the farm to the city does not guarantee a better life, at least in the short term. But the last two centuries offer ample evidence that by just about every metric of human health, freedom, and material well-being, urbanisation, industrialisation, and agricultural modernisation are processes that have been overwhelmingly positive for humans.

Moreover, as a leading proponent of rewilding, we hope that Monbiot will think a bit harder about where all those rewilded landscapes in which, he hopes “nature is allowed to do its own thing, in which it can be to some extent self-willed, driven by its own dynamic processes” are likely to come from. On a planet of 7, going on 9 billion people, agricultural modernisation and intensification are clearly the most plausible path to leaving more of the Earth to nature.

### 1NR – AT: Homogenization

### 1NR – AT: Tech

#### 3 – Small farms can’t use that tech.

**Vos 15** [Rob, Director of Agricultural Development Economics at the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) of the United Nations, “Thought for Food: Strengthening Global Governance of Food Security,” Department of Economic & Social Affairs, CDP Background Paper No. 29, November 2015, <http://www.un.org/en/development/desa/policy/cdp/cdp_background_papers/bp2015_29.pdf>]

The world possesses the technologies to significantly step up farm productivity, including through climate-smart methods (Vos, 2014). However, can we expect these to be adopted widely by farmers around the world? Smallholder family farmers in developing countries tend to find it difficult to access these technologies, because of inadequate infrastructure, low education, and lack of credits. Many of them live and work in vulnerable ecosystems, which may become even more fragile because of climate change. In addition, farmer populations are aging rapidly. Worldwide, the average age of farmers is about sixty, including in developing countries, and many among them are women and poorly educated (see, for example Jöhr, 2012; Gorman, 2013). Older farmers are less likely to introduce new, transformative production techniques. One could expect their children to do so, especially in developing countries where 60 percent of the population is under twenty-five years of age and most living in rural areas. The problem is, however, that few rural youths see a future for themselves in agriculture (Vos, 2014).

### 1NR – AT: Impact D

### 1NR – AT: Disease

### 1NR – More Cards [Industry Good]

#### Land-use is down and production is up.

Grunewald '19 - Food and Ag Analyst @ Breakthrough   
[Caroline and Dan Blaustein-Rejto, Dec 9, "Big, not broken," https://thebreakthrough.org/issues/food/big-not-broken]

How do we measure agricultural sustainability?

The idea that the US agricultural system is broken and getting steadily worse is often treated as self-evident in environmental circles. After all, the environmental impacts of US agriculture are massive. Farming spans 40% of US land and produces 9% percent of our greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions.

But this reasoning confuses scale with sustainability. Measures of total impacts are determined not just by how farmers produce food, but also by how much they must produce to meet consumer demand. The impacts of US farming are huge in large part because we produce a lot of food — the total value of US agricultural production has increased by over 125% since 1961 and is around 11 times greater than the UK’s total value of production.

Nonetheless, such statistics are often proffered as conclusive evidence that US farming is broken and in need of a revolution, with critics often calling for mass adoption of specific practices such as organic farming, cover cropping, or grass-fed cattle grazing. But a fixation with practices supplants an empirical approach to the question of whether the impacts of US agricultural production are indeed headed in the wrong direction.

If we care about agricultural sustainability, we should care enough to measure it, holding constant confounding trends that say nothing about the environmental performance of food production itself. We can accomplish this by tracking intensity measures. Unlike total impacts, intensity measures — the environmental impact or quantity of inputs per unit of agricultural production — isolate the environmental performance of farmers and other agricultural producers.

Once we hone in on the environmental intensity of agricultural production, we can see that US farmers have steadily been improving for the last half-century.

However much better we might think agricultural sustainability would be in a radically different vision of food production, intellectual honesty dictates that we acknowledge what has actually been occurring, and that the further improvements we desire would continue or accelerate, rather than reverse, the historical trajectory.

### 1NR – More Cards [Link]

#### The plan shifts the farming paradigm away from intensive ag towards nostalgic ideas of the farm that are less efficient and incapable of feeding the planet, but more importantly use a great deal more land, turning all of their environment internals and preventing our ability to hit peak cropland

Blomqvist ‘16 - Director of Conservation @ The Breakthrough Institute   
[Linus and David Douglas, "Is Precision Agriculture the way to peak cropland," Dec 7, thebreakthrough.org/issues/the-future-of-food/is-precision-agriculture-the-way-to-peak-cropland]

But today, robots, drones, sensors, and AI software are beginning to make it possible to employ the sort of intensive, fine-grained management practiced by poor farmers and yield contest winners at scales that have been previously unimaginable.26 Soil properties that affect crop performance on the scale of weeks or even days may one day be measured or remotely sensed in ten-square-meter units as compared to every 10 or 100 hectares. Application of fertilizers may be adapted to each little corner of a field, as opposed to a uniform rate across an entire farm. In short, global agriculture might follow the evolution of global manufacturing from hand crafting to mass production to mass customization, giving each plant the benefit of hand crafting, but with the efficiency of mass production. The 30 odd years from now until 2050 is a long time in the fast-paced world of innovation. There is no reason to believe that our vision of 2050 agricultural practice will be any more accurate than a 1980’s corn farmer walking into a corn farming operation today. Our GPS-driven tractors, harvesters that create detailed yield maps, and seeds that resist common diseases and pests and can thrive at unheard-of plant densities would all seem other-worldly to a 1980s time traveler. And remember that our 1980s corn farmer had never heard of the Internet. As a result, there is no reason to believe that we can even enumerate all of the technologies that will be making a difference in crop yield or demand in 2050. Maybe some important ideas will come out of indoor farming and be successfully adapted at mass scale. Maybe our increasing insight into the role of the microbiome in the health of all macro-organisms will yield a wonder, pro-biotic seed coating. Or maybe, like the Internet or GPS, an innovation will be so fantastic that, sitting here 30 years prior, we can’t even see it coming. In the end, none of these technologies, evolutionary or revolutionary, will be adopted overnight, and their diffusion will depend not just on their cost but also on broader socioeconomic factors.76 Neither success nor failure is inevitable – a lot depends on the choices that are made today by farmers, corporations, nation-states, and international organizations. Progress in breeding and agronomy have been, and will likely continue to be, closely correlated with the resources invested in technological innovation through research in both the public and private sectors, and in agricultural extension to ensure rapid technology transfer.17,77–80 Much work remains to be done to reach peak farmland while minimizing agriculture’s harmful impacts on the environment. Yet the technologies and practices that are being developed and adopted today give us plenty of hope that this can ultimately be achieved.

#### Their hippy claims oversimplify the fact that demand for meat is inevitable, it is a question of how its production has on the environment

Ogle ‘16 - historian and the author of In Meat We Trust  
[Maureen, "A Meatier Story A Response to Breakthrough’s Essay on Meat Production," Dec 19, https://thebreakthrough.org/index.php/issues/the-future-of-food/responses-the-future-of-meat/a-meatier-story]

For that, I blame the conventional narrative. Its flabby simplicity has lured generations of consumer, environmental, and rural activists who’ve railed against “industrial” livestock production. They’re convinced that large-scale production is the problem, and “big food” the perpetrator. As a result, they’re ~~blinded~~ to the long view of the big picture. They don’t see that scale is a consequence, not a cause. As a result, their proposed solutions are nostalgic projects aimed at reviving an imagined small-scale “family” farming. When it comes to the problem of meat, it’s hard to imagine a more useless idea. Imagine, instead, a perspective that calculates demand as a given, and large-scale livestock production as a necessity. Perhaps that would inspire critics to channel their energy into projects that transform problematic necessities into environmental benefits. Maybe someone would finally figure out how to use anaerobic digestion to tame manure emissions. As long as the conventional narrative shapes our politics (and our research dollars), meat’s environmental drawbacks will remain a plague on the land. It’s time for a new story, one rooted in the realities of human history and behavior.